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1 April 1945
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F Company is assigned three officers and 36 enlisted men.
1st Lt
William C. Mathers, 1st platoon;
1st Lt Robert L. Clark, 2nd platoon;
2nd Lt. LeRoy T. Elliott,
4th (mortar) platoon.
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The
replacements were fresh from the United States.
Battlefield
commissions, which necessitated a transfer of the officer involved to
another battalion, took some familiar faces from us, and likewise introduced
new personalities to our circle.
Staff Sergeant
John R. Phillips had been a platoon sergeant when he went home on leave from
Noemfoor and had served much of the time on Corregidor as platoon sergeant
of the 3rd platoon. At that time the position called for a staff sergeant,
but he was commissioned before he could be promoted.
New
1st Lt. William E.
LaVanchure was transferred to 2d Battalion headquarters. 1st Lt.
Milton Walker, a former platoon sergeant in "C" company was assigned to “F”
Company. The same was true for 1st Lt. Chalmers Fennell who was a former
platoon sergeant in “I” Company.
Tech Sergeant
Phillip Todd was rotated home. (I would later receive a letter from
him after we went to Negros, telling me of the joys of civilian life. What a
terrible way to treat a Brother! )
I
became "F"
Company's Executive Officer.
Another mission is in the air again. The Regiment is alerted to jump on an
unknown island. Company is issued parachutes but that is cancelled in good
fashion. But the mission is still on, but is to take place with the airborne
part out.
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2 April 1945
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F.O. # 10 issued by 2d Bn
S-3
Field Order
Number 10 is dated 4 April, and is reproduced as at that date.
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3 April 1945
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" Many of us regretted the change. We had little
faith in Eichelberger and great faith in Kreuger, but then they don't ask the
working man." |
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After the Corregidor mission the 503d was switched to
the Eighth Army, under the command of General Robert
Lawrence Eichelberger. Operationally, this removed them from the care of
General Walter Krueger, considered by both rank and file to be a
"soldier's soldier." Eichelberger, though
a perfectly adequate commander when held on a tight rein by
MacArthur, was not a first-rank soldier. He was
disliked as much as Krueger was liked, but MacArthur's attention
was elsewhere.
Placed within the command of the
40th Infantry Division, the 503d RCT came under
the more immediate control of Major General Rapp Brush. Whether
Brush was favoring the 185th Infantry RCT by resting them early, or
whether he had begun to panic when faced with different tactics in
Negros that had been expected, he nonetheless resolved to use the
nearest weapon available to him, and that was
the 503d PRCT, at that time still in reserve on Mindoro and coping with an influx
of replacements for the losses which had occurred on Corregidor.
When Brush's troops contacted the enemy as they moved
inland, the general became alarmed and called for help. He assigned the
503d's zone of operation and mission 8 April. The 503d was to destroy
all hostile forces within its sector and protect the north flank of the
185th Infantry RCT. It just so happened that the defensive system which
the Japs had been constructing for months was entirely within the 503d's
sector. As to protecting the north flank of the 185th, they were so dug
in and forted in they needed neither protection nor assistance.
They stayed in their fort until they were moved back to Panay.
The 503d
numbered 2,000 when they departed Mindoro. This included the badly
depleted 1st Bn., which had been decimated by the great explosion at
Monkey Point. They had received replacements, but just enough to
stay near the entrance number.
It is said that to the man with a hammer, the entire world
looks like the head of a nail, and in retrospect, that appears to be the way the
40th Division would use the premier Parachute unit in the Pacific, as
inappropriate a choice of tool to fight a jungle war as it would have been to
issue parachutes instead of flashlights to a regiment of Broadway usherettes.
It was a case of using the wrong weapon, for the wrong reasons, simply
because they were available to throw into the breach.
There was a saving grace. To the
503d, they attached a 4.2 chemical mortar Company. This unit saved
the 503d's lives.
-o-0-o-
The following units were attached to the 503d at one
time or another during this next phase of operations:
2d platoon, C Company, 716th Tank Battalion;
One platoon of the
160th Cannon Company under the command of 2d Lt Paul Gentle;
80th Chemical Mortar (under command of 1st Lt Robert W. Spenser);
"B" Battery, 470th AAA Battalion;
Units of 739 AAA Battalion;
165th Station Hospital.
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4 April 1945
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Aerial reconnaissance by Capt. Taylor & Capt. McRoberts of operation area. |
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(The following is an extract facsimile
only)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
503d Prcht. Inf. RCT
F.O. #10
4
April 1945:
(EXTRACT)
1.
...
2.
a. On "J" Day the 503d RCT (less one battalion reinforced) will drop in the
vicinity of the ALICANTE AIRFIELD, NEGROS ISLAND (22-17), advance rapidly to
the west and seize and secure SARAVIA (TOWN) (17-16), then advance rapidly
to the south to effect a junction with the 185th Infantry in the vicinity of
IMBANG RIVER BRIDGE (17.2-10.2).
b.
"J" Day: 6 April 1945
3.
See Opn. Map, Entrucking Plan, Plane loading Plan, plane Parking Plan, Plane
Flight Plan.
a.
The 3d Bn with (1) platoon Btry "D", and (1) Demolition Section attached
will
(1) Drop on "J' FIELD on "J" Dat at 0900I and secure drop area.
(2) Effect immediate reconnaissance in areas shown on Opn. Map.
(3) Be prepared, upon arrival of the 2d Lift at "J" Field to proceed south and
seize and secure MALAGO AIRFIELD. See Opn. Map.
b.
The 2d Bn, with one platoon, Btry. "D", 462d FA and (1) Demolition Section
attached will drop on "J' Field j Day at 1200I and immediately proceed west
seize ant' secure SARAVIA (TOWN). See Opn. Map.
c.
The 462d FA Bn 9less "C" and Btry. "D") will:
(1) Drop on "J" field on "J" Day in conjunction with the 2d and 3d Bns., and
assemble in the area shown on Opn. Map.
(2) Be prepared to support the assault forces by fire as ordered by Bn
Commanders.
d.
Co. "C", 161st Engineers (less one (1) platoon, will drop on "J" FIELD on
"J" Day at OgOOI and be prepared to construct a liasion plane landing strip
in the vicinity of ALICANTE AIRFIELD (22-17)." [liaison]
e. Hq. Co. will drop on "J" field on "J" Day in conjunction with the
landing of the 2d and 3d Bns., and will perform the normal duties of
administration and communication.
f.
Service Co. will drop on "j" field on "J" Day in conjunction with the
landing of the 2d and 3d Bns., and
perform the normal duties of supply, administration, and evacuation
as directed by RCT S-4.
g.
The 1st Bn., with Btry. "C" and one platoon of Btry. "D", 462d FA Bn, one
(1) platoon Co. "C", 161st Engineers and one Demolition Section, attached as
EIGHT ARMY RESERVE, will be prepared to move from Mindoro and drop an 24
hours notice in an area designated by Headquarters, EIGHT U.S. ARMY, to
assist in the destruction of the enemy."
John W. Britten,
Lt. Col.
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5 April 1945
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1000 hr - Final ???? operation
issued to company commanders. Scheduled to entruck for Elmore Airfield at
1230I.
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1900 |
Plans changed, will not
jump -
will fly to Panay & proceed by boat to Negros. |
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Field Order #10 was issued dated 5 April 1945 under signature of Col. Britten
as executive officer, continuing in the same role as he had been for the
Corregidor operation. It will be cancelled later the same day, as
information is received that the enemy is not defending the coastal regions.
Colonel
Joe Lawrie was still in the U.S. on temporary duty attending Command and General Staff
School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. |
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6 April 1945
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0900 - Camp in order, policed, men prepared to move out on notice |
1315 |
Capt Taylor called to meeting at1st Bn C.P., received plans of
departure |
1415 |
Entrucked for strip, 16 trucks hauling 8 plane loads each trip. Balance
of Bn will follow in morning as only
4
Planes can land at Ito Ito strip. |
1515 |
Awaiting planes at Elmore Strip, received orders to return to camp. 2d
Bn planes still circling field as only two planes can land. |
1600 |
Expect to leave early Saturday a.m. this may develop into a jump mission
after all. |
1900 |
Received orders to entruck again for strip at
0615
hrs,
7
Aug (sic)
45
First plane to leave at
0730
hrs.
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0800 |
Waiting on word from Air Corps as to strip: Can C-46's land at Iloilo? -
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0915 |
Entrucked; first lift left for planes. 3 Bn Reinforced W/RHQ Co. |
1200 |
First flight of 6 planes to leave every half hour; return and pick up 2d
flight. |
1320 |
First flight of planes landed on strip at Iloilo; entrucked to wharves
and loaded on LCI's, other flights arrived on similar schedule. Came
under control of 40th Division. |
1900 |
5 LCI's loaded with first lift pulled out into harbour to anchor over
night and await high tide. LCI's
overcrowded; 250 on 190 man ship.. |
2400 |
No unusual events - at least no confirmation of rumored Field Artillery
plane cracking up on take-off. |
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On 6 April the
3d Battalion left by plane to land on Panay, the island north of
Negros. They crossed the Guimaras Straits by LCI's.
We would enplane the next morning |
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7 April 1945
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0630 hr -
2 Bn, with
63
Arty & 12 RHQ attached entrucked for strip |
0750 |
C-46's
took off for a very smooth riding trip, much better riding than
C-47's, arriving
at Iloilo strip,
Panay. |
0900 |
Trucks awaiting hauled
Bn thru Ilo Ilo city to docks.
Ilo Ilo City, a city of 90,000 still in
good condition except for wharehouses at docks that were
fired by Japs. Traveled 150 air miles from San dose, Mindoro
to Ilo Ilo City, Panay. |
1000
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Remained in immediate vicinity of docks until all were flown in. |
1205 |
Instructions from Col Jones to Capt Taylor to follow in wake of 3d Bn
from Mindoro.
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(Captain
Neil Taylor was the 2d Battalion commanding officer.) |
1400
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LCI's embarked for Pandan Pt. Negros, P.I. 50 miles via boat. |
1745
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Landed at Pulapandan, Negros and encamped in town square
for the night. Civilians had a
dance in town square, our boys were
pushing the local gals around the floor." |
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20 Mar. 45 thru 7 Apr. 45 Co rested and replacements came in---Co. began
staging for next mission." |
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Broke camp and departed for San Jose Airstrip at 0630 Hr. Emplaned and left
San Jose strip at 0815 Hr. Arrived at Ilo Ilo, Panay, P.I. at 0945 Hr.
Traveled 150 air miles at 1100 Hr Loaded on L.C.I.'s at Ilo Ilo. arrived at
1745 Hr at Pulu Pondan, Negros Isl. Distance traveled by L.C.I. 50 miles.
Bivouaced for nite in town square.
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The movement of the RCT, less the 1st Battalion reinforced who were to
remain on Mindoro as the reserve force - (The 1st Battalion was still
reforming after the devastating losses of the "big explosion" on
Corregidor), began on 6 April and was completed on 8 April. The units were
flown on C-46's to Iloilo City, Panay, and then crossed the straits to
Pulapandan, Negros by LCI's. |
0630 |
LCI's headed toward Green Beach at Negros Island. Four LCI's in
unescorted convoy. These ships to return for more troops. |
0945 |
First elements laneded on Green's Beach, Pulu Pandan, Negros Island.
Entrucked immediately for operational area. |
1130 |
Staff left for operational area with Col Jones. Col Jones made recco
flight, observed area, and checked on G-2 situation. |
1600 |
CP established at (30.3-6.2), about 45 miles from Green Beach. 3d Bn
established perimeter. FA and Engrs set up in vicinity of CP. |
1700 |
Staff and CO meeting to brief on G-2 situation, mission, administrative
details. |
1650 |
Radioed position to CG 40th Division (30.3-6.15). •- |
1630 |
To CO 503d RCT: Location? CG 40th. |
1402
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To CO 503d RCT: Last element of 503d
RCT became A/B at 1200 pd 3500 rds 75 How ammo forwarded next
planes. (CG 24th) |
1800 |
To CG 40th Div: When will msgr arrive here? (Levine) |
1930 |
To CG 40th Div: Situation 1800I: CP group and 3d Bn group bivouaced
(30.3-6.15).Patrols SE vicinity towns Navilas, Manssiguio, Manzanares,
and (36.0-8.90. Recce patrols south to contact 185th NE to towns of
Sinaypanan and San Isidro. (Clark)" |
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The first patrol made to these "towns" was F company on 9 April.
This
will be covered in due time. |
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2000 |
To CO 503 RCT: Msgr to arrive 0945 and 1555 daily. |
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(CG 40th) |
2100 |
All dug in and waiting. |
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Early this morning the battalion moved to San Jose (Elmore) Strip,
loaded
on C-46's, and left at 0755. After
an hour and twenty minutes flying we arrived at a tiny
air strip near Iloilo City at 0915. The planes were delayed in landing,
because the strip was so
small that only three planes could occupy it at one time. The strip was
surrounded by coconut trees. Our pilot sweated it out, clearing the coconut trees
and then dropping down
quickly on the landing field and stopping before he hit the coconut
trees at the far end. We
moved by trucks to the to the docks on the broad river which was an
excellent harbor. There was a large warehouse area along the docks. Some of these
warehouses had been destroyed
or damaged by bombing or shelling, or the Japs had burned them.
A large crowd of Filipinos had gathered there to watch us. After several
hours we load on LCI's and crossed the straits to
Negros Island. The battalion set sail, and we landed on the open beach at Pulapandan about
1735. "F" Company landed near a high masonry wall
around a -wealthy
estate. We moved around the walls to the city plaza. This was a small
town with a large square. The plaza was a pretty grass covered flatland
with a band stand located in the middle of the plaza.
Coca Cola and Shell Oil signs on businesses around the square brought back memories of
home. The town held a dance that night. We bivouacked on the
plaza that night.
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Further Research: - Today's Regiment's
Periodic Report
(Click on graphic to open new window)
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ALL
MEMORIES AND NO OFFICIAL RECORDS
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There is confusion whether or not a mission had been planned for 7 April.
No official records appear to have been found concerning a mission to
Fabrica, yet many troopers set out that morning on a combat jump.
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The official records reveal that the jump, which had been planned to take
place at Alicante Airfield was cancelled. This should settle the matter, but
it does not, at least in the minds of some of the men who were prepared to
jump.
John Reynolds, who had joined "D" Company as a replacement at Mindoro, gives
the following account
Of course I will never forget the situation because I got on
the plane at Mindoro fully expecting to make my first combat jump and trying
to convince myself it was to be just like those training jumps I had made at
Ft. Benning. When I say "I got on the plane " that is only part of
the story. I got on the plane with the assistance of two guys standing on
each side of the steps. I was not a very big person and at the time only
weighed 135 pounds, if that much, and I know damn well I had more than that
on my back and attached to the other parts of my body. My legs would not
permit me to make the first step up the ladder, even though I could walk.
So, with a bit of help I got up on the ladder and was then able to proceed
on into the plane. Those memories stick with you a long time. I am so glad
to hear that someone in another company can relate that they also left
Mindoro with the idea that we would be jumping on Negros. I have talked with
to several other "D" Company people and they each confirm my memories.
Except John Lindgren, and isn't that amazing?
A version of the "D" Company history which I copied (or
really I should say the copy I made of the "D Co" History
of
the Negros Mission when we were still back on Negros after
the war) begins 8 Apr 45 with an account of the company moving from
Pulapandan. There is another version which on 7 Apr 45 states "Co had
enplaned at Mindoro with full combat pack and chutes in expected jump on
Negros. Planes diverted to Iloilo on Panay, went to Pulapandan by boat and
bivouaced in town square".
If that entry was in the original history which I copied I
cannot believe that I missed it. It is extremely difficult to overlook the
very first entry in a document- down in the middle of the text- perhaps, but
not the very first entry. The grammar which states that "Co had enplaned"
might possibly suggest that this entry was made at a time after I had made
the copy. John Lindgren disputes the entry for 2 reasons - he believes that
it was made later by someone who did not know what happened and just wanted
to embellish the mission with a possible jump situation; he also doubts that
there was anyone learned enough to spell "bivouaced".
Bill, you and I have to talk to lindgrean about this because
we both know that there were people who got on the plane at Mindoro
expecting to jump on Negros."
John Reynold's memory cannot be dismissed lightly. This man was new to the
unit. He had no former jumps or preparations
for jumps retained in his mind which could become intermingled or mixed up
with other
like circumstances. This was his one and only circumstance. John's
description of the load he carried and the assistance he required to climb
the steps into the plane is absolutely factual. I well remember that we had
to have assistance climbing the steps to board the plane for_Corregidor and
then again for Negros. The bulky parachutes with our weapon strapped
underneath the belly band was cumbersome enough, but we had the parachute
kit bag, loops of the carrying handles through the chest strap, and then
under the belly band so that the bag could not fly up and hit you in the
face on opening impact. Our musette bag and extra grenades and ammunition
were stowed in the kit bag. It was heavy and bunged you on the knees when
you walked. John Reynolds continues that in readying himself to make his
first combat jump he is trying to convince himself that that it was going to
be like "those training jumps I had made at Benning." This rings sure and
true, and I fully
expect that
thousands of other paratrooopers of WWII followed this line of thought while
waiting to make their first combat jump. Just as some memories of the
Corregidor jump are so deeply engraved in my mind that I remember them as
though it was yesterday, I know where John is coming from.
John Lindgren, who had initially adopted the view that the mission had been
cancelled prior to enplaning, and who questioned John Reynold's
recollection, eventually settled the matter thus:
Bill, I now have a second confirmation of the parachutes
being worn from Mindoro. Your account, itself a third confirmation,
is very clear and I got a version from Gordon Bates who would be the 4th
platoon sergeant on Negros after Joe Gouvin went home. We had a
mortarman, John Seymour, who was a kind of a hard luck guy as I
remember. He was a short, cheerful heavily built man with black hair
that, young as he was then, had receded extensively at his forehead. He
was in Bates' squad and Gordon was helping him put on his chute at
Mindoro before getting on the plane for Negros. Seymour was pulling up
on the leg straps to buckle them when to his astonishment the leg strap
tore away from the webbing and he was left holding it in his hand.
Seymour joined after we came back from Corregidor so the incident had to
occur when we emplaned at Mindoro.
I give up, capitulate and admit grave error for doubting
that intrepid columnist John Reynolds."
As to my own memories, I feel I have a good memory even though there
are events which I have completely forgotten. I know memory plays tricks. I
know we get events, times, places, etc. intermingled. I, also, know
some memories are vivid than others. I remember, so well, loading on the
trucks at our camp on Mindoro for Corregidor. Major Caskey came by and shook
my hand, wishing me good luck. I recall the drive to Hill Strip, and
detrucking as the planes (some pock-marked with bullet holes) coming in. I
don't remember which strip or the details of the leading the morning of 7
April. I do remember we were to jump on the pilot's signal,
the green light. I attended the one week jump master school at Fort Benning
during the early summer of 1943. They took a dim view of the pilots' ability
to jumpmaster. I believe in this case the pilots were to jumpmaster because
we had not been briefed on the
"GO" point.
I do have a vivid memory which is conclusive to me that we did board the
plane loaded to jump. I will get to that memory shortly. First, I want to
say we had traveled with our parachutes before and did not jump. That was 4
June 1944 when we traveled from Dobodura to Hollandia. The difference was we
carried our chutes and wore our musette bags. There was no intention of
jumping. Chutes were carried so that we
could use them in an air assault staged from Hollandia.
Now back to the
vivid memory, spoken of above. After we had traveled sometime the crew chief
came back and told me the pilot wanted to see me. I went to the cockpit,
where he told me "The jump is off! The mill at Fabrica is on fire." (I
understood we were to jump in the open
ground west of Fabrica and move to seize the lumber mill network along with
its considerable rail equipment). "Orders are to put your parachutes
in the kit bags and leave them on the plane. When you get through, come back
up here and I'll show you a landing." I went back and had the men take
off their chutes, get their musette bags and gear out of the kit bags, and
put the chutes in the bags. Then I went
back to the cockpit and stood between the pilot and co-pilot in the crew
chief's stand.
I knew the pilot was sweating the landing, since he had been there the day
before delivering
the 3d battalion. We flew over what seemed like millions of coconut trees,
and then one of the pilots said "There it is!" I could now see a
small opening up ahead. We dropped down, almost brushing the tops of the
coconut palms, and then landed on a coral, or caliche, strip. The pilots
frantically braked the big plane to get stopped before running into the
coconut trees on the far side of the strip.
I had not thought
too much
of the dangers until I saw that the pilots were drenched with perspiration
after we stopped.
As I remember, only three planes could get down at once. We unloaded, and
the plane cleared out to make room for more planes. We loaded on waiting
trucks and proceeded to Iloilo City. This was the largest city we had seen
since Brisbane. The trucks went on to the docks on the river, where we
unloaded. The area was lined with warehouses. Some had been damaged by fires
set by the Japanese. We waited several hours for the force to get in from
Mindoro. A crowd of natives were gathered around us. We bought bananas,
pineapples, and other tropical fruits from them. It was a very pleasant
interlude. One that stays in your memory. Mindoro had been a place of
sadness after the return from Corregidor. Now the battalion was gathered
together for the first time (and last time ever, though we did not know it
then) since before Corregidor. We visited. Some friends who had been wounded
on Corregidor were now back. So my memories of Iloilo City are pleasant.
My
theory about the
discrepancies between the official record and the recollection of the
participants, is that the 3d Battalion was in movement to Iloilo City on 6
April, with no preparations for a jump. Sometime during that day, concern
over what the Japanese might do to Fabrica developed. The 2d Battalion
was scheduled to move by air the next day following the 3d Battalion. The
chutes and jump equipment was on hand from the preparation for the Alicante
Airfield assault. Why not drop the 2d Battalion at Fabrica and save it?
There was a good drop zone, and the land features easy to locate. Just
follow Highway Number One east to Fabrica. The Lagasan River would be a good
get ready point (red light). The flat, open fields west of the town was
easily located. I don't know what the real truth was, but I do know a lot of
people left Mindoro that morning expecting to make a parachute jump. |
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