|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
HEADQUARTERS |
: |
UNITED STATES
ARMY IN THE FAR EAST
RA/mab
APO 501
FEBD
334 16 May 1945
USAFFE Board
No. 309
SUBJECT:
CORREGIDOR ISLAND OPERATION,
16 Feb - 8 Mar 1945.
TO : The Adjutant General,
Washington 25, D. C.
(Thru: Combat
Analysis Section, Operations
Division, WDGS
To: Commanding General, Army
Ground Forces,
Commanding
General, Army Air Forces,
Airborne
Training Center, Camp
Mackall, N.C.,
Parachute
School, Ft. Benning,
Georgia.)
1. Sources:
a. Plan and orders "Rock
Force", Volume 2,
b. Personal observation of
Lt. Colonel ROBERT
ALEXANDER, CE (Prcht, and
Major WAYNE O. OSMUNDSON,
Sig C, Members USAFFE Board.
2. Purpose:
To furnish ,tactical and
technical data on a unique
operation and to draw
certain conclusions
therefrom on which are based
certain recommendations on
airborne equipment and
related matters,
3. Sitting
astride the entrance to
MANILA BAY and guarding its
approaches from the CHINA
SEA are four islands;
CORREGIDOR, CABALLO, EL
FRALE, and CARIBAO. For 300
years prior to the American
occupation of the
PHILIPPINES these islands
formed the outer chain of
defense for Spain's �Pearl
of the Orient�. Her
lookouts, posted on their
rugged topsides, signaled
the approach of Chinese
junk, Spanish galleon, Moro
vinta, British three-decker,
and the advent of DEWEY's
White Squadron.
Following
the destruction of the
Spanish fleet at CAVITE, two
generations of American
soldiers watched the steady
development of these islands
as a modern coast defense
installation until the
broken forces of General
WAINWRIGHT lowered the
American flag on 6 May 1942.
CORREGIDOR is
the key position of the
four. From it can be
supported the sea defenses
of the MERIVELES shore and
it in turn supports and is
supported by the other three
islands of the chain. Its
possession insures the
possessor control of the
harbor entrance and this
control became a pressing
necessity as the flying
columns of General WALTER
KREUGER�s sixth Army closed
in for the recapture of
MANILA. It had been
emphatically demonstrated by
the Japanese in 1942 that
amphibious assault of this
island could be costly in
the extreme. However, the
means by which amphibious
assault could be avoided lay
ready to the hand of the
Commander in Chief in the
form of a hard-bitten,
battle-tested, striking
force of proven ability --
the 503d ROT, Parachute. A
new type of assault force,
this, the product of modern
technical skill, whose
advent would again startle
the lookouts, this time
Japanese, posted on the
TOPSIDE of CORREGIDOR.
Lookouts destined to perish
with their kind in flame
filled caves or bullet
riddled gullies at the hands
of Colonel GEORGE M JONES'
skilled paratroopers.
4.
Commanders� Estimate of the
Situation: This
extremely interesting
document is not available
for study but certain
aspects
of the conditions
influencing the decision to
assault by air may be
discussed. The suitability
of an aerial assault was
obvious. Its feasibility,
while involving some
difficulties, was fairly
evident but the
acceptability of the
operation was certainly open
to critical inspection and
examination.
|