During the ensuing
days to include 23 February, when organized enemy resistance virtually
ceased on TOPSIDE, the scheme of maneuver had for its objective a
gradual enlargement of the perimeter and the destruction of enemy
forces. The Japs obligingly assisted in the latter process. His
persistence in reoccupying at night those positions cleaned out by day
made it possible for the paratroop patrols to withdraw to the perimeter
each night, secure in the knowledge that the following dawn would find
game available in the same places it had been found previously. By this
scheme the perimeter was kept secure and the enemy eliminated. Daylight
patrols worked further and further out as the mop-up progressed.
Overlays 7 to 23 show the general extent of operations during the period
16 to 23 February. By 23 February the bulk of the 503d was available for
employment in a coordinated attack to begin clearing THE TAIL.
The systematic
mop-up of TOPSIDE and the western portion of the ROCK followed what
became a well defined pattern. This system em�ployed patrols operating
against enemy pockets of resistance, each patrol closely supported by
heavy weapons and artillery and accompanied by assault and demolition
personnel armed with flame throwers and plenti�fully supplied with
explosives and WP. Here, as elsewhere, the enemy holed in when attacked.
The usual method of cave clearance was to position Thompson sub-machine
gun men and riflemen to cover other per�sonnel advancing on cave
entrances. WP and flame throwers were used to inflict casualties or
drive the enemy further in. Those who made a break were cut down by
automatic or rifle fire. The cave was then blown shut by high
explosives. By 23 February 164 caves had been sealed. The Jap here, as
elsewhere, committed suicide when cornered.
On the night of
18-19 February a Jap attack succeeded in infiltrating a few enemy
individuals to the CP, 2d Battalion 503d. This attack, executed by the
ENDO FORCE (Marines) was the only attempt at coordinated attack made by
the Japs. From that time on the Jap could read the "Off Limits" sign on
TOPSIDE and contented himself with life (and death) in the caves and
ravines. Individuals infiltrated and sniped without material effect.
General support of the mop-up was furnished by air strike and naval
bombardment on call. The Air employed Napalm, HE, and strafing. The Navy
used 5"/38 gunfire against cave and tunnel entrances.
One point in
connection with the use of flame thrower in cave reduction is worthy of
note. The flame thrower fuel was often projected unignited into the cave
and ignited later by white phosphorous grenade. Use of this method
obtained full results from available fuel, got the fuel into the inner
portion of the cave and enabled troops to avoid the backdraft. The
bazooka and rifle grenade are not in favor with the troops for this type
of operation and were not used to any great extent.
For night
illumination the Navy employed star shell on call and illuminating
mortar shell was extensively used.
75mm Howitzer fire
with direct laying was employed on cave and tunnel entrances, using a
high percentage of white phosphorous. In many instances these weapons
were broken down, hand packed to new positions, and reassembled for this
mission. (See Overlays 5, 8, ll, 14, 17, 20, and 22)
.50 cal HMG sections of Battery D were assigned to the
Infantry Companies as direct support weapon. The normal night
positioning of these guns is shown on Overlay 23.
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