8

 

During the ensuing days to include 23 February, when organized enemy resistance virtually ceased on TOPSIDE, the scheme of maneuver had for its objective a gradual enlargement of the perimeter and the destruction of enemy forces. The Japs obligingly assisted in the latter process. His persistence in reoccupying at night those positions cleaned out by day made it possible for the paratroop patrols to withdraw to the perimeter each night, secure in the knowledge that the following dawn would find game available in the same places it had been found previously. By this scheme the perimeter was kept secure and the enemy eliminated. Daylight patrols worked further and further out as the mop-up progressed. Overlays 7 to 23 show the general extent of operations during the period 16 to 23 February. By 23 February the bulk of the 503d was available for employment in a coordinated attack to begin clearing THE TAIL.

The systematic mop-up of TOPSIDE and the western portion of the ROCK followed what became a well defined pattern. This system em�ployed patrols operating against enemy pockets of resistance, each patrol closely supported by heavy weapons and artillery and accompanied by assault and demolition personnel armed with flame throwers and plenti�fully supplied with explosives and WP. Here, as elsewhere, the enemy holed in when attacked. The usual method of cave clearance was to position Thompson sub-machine gun men and riflemen to cover other per�sonnel advancing on cave entrances. WP and flame throwers were used to inflict casualties or drive the enemy further in. Those who made a break were cut down by automatic or rifle fire. The cave was then blown shut by high explosives. By 23 February 164 caves had been sealed. The Jap here, as elsewhere, committed suicide when cornered.

On the night of 18-19 February a Jap attack succeeded in infiltrating a few enemy individuals to the CP, 2d Battalion 503d. This attack, executed by the ENDO FORCE (Marines) was the only attempt at coordinated attack made by the Japs. From that time on the Jap could read the "Off Limits" sign on TOPSIDE and contented himself with life (and death) in the caves and ravines. Individuals infiltrated and sniped without material effect.

General support of the mop-up was furnished by air strike and naval bombardment on call. The Air employed Napalm, HE, and strafing. The Navy used 5"/38 gunfire against cave and tunnel entrances.

One point in connection with the use of flame thrower in cave reduction is worthy of note. The flame thrower fuel was often projected unignited into the cave and ignited later by white phosphorous grenade. Use of this method obtained full results from available fuel, got the fuel into the inner portion of the cave and enabled troops to avoid the backdraft. The bazooka and rifle grenade are not in favor with the troops for this type of operation and were not used to any great extent.

For night illumination the Navy employed star shell on call and illuminating mortar shell was extensively used.

75mm Howitzer fire with direct laying was employed on cave and tunnel entrances, using a high percentage of white phosphorous. In many instances these weapons were broken down, hand packed to new positions, and reassembled for this mission. (See Overlays 5, 8, ll, 14, 17, 20, and 22)

.50 cal HMG sections of Battery D were assigned to the Infantry Companies as direct support weapon. The normal night positioning of these guns is shown on Overlay 23.

 

 

9

 

b.                     3d Battalion 34th Infantry: This unit had found plenty to occupy it in the BOTTOMSIDE area. Sitting practically in the lap of 3000 Japs, its main efforts were devoted to the elimination of enemy elements capable of firing on the beach area and landing craft approaching the beach, containing the Japs holed up in the MALINTA TUNNEL System, and in preparing for the eventual cleanup of the MONKEY POINT area. 

 

c.   Rock Force: On 25 February the 3d Battalion 34th Infantry had been relieved by the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry. The relieving troops retained a platoon of the cannon company with M-7�s and 2 Sherman Tanks, which landed on D-Day.

The attack to clear the TAIL and MONKEY POINT was made by the 503d with two battalions abreast which later assumed a battalion in column formation as the land narrowed. The mission of. the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry was mop-up of overrun enemy in the path of the 503d. Artillery support for this attack was furnished by the 462d FA Battalion from positions on TOPSIDE, shown on Overlay 22.

The eastern portion of the island had been overrun by 2 March and the action, except for the elimination of small enemy pockets, was virtually complete. During this phase, as during the preceding phase, the enemy resorted to mass suicide when driven underground. MALINTA HILL tunnels were the site of many explosions, beginning 17 February. These explosions sealed the galleries and tunnels with an unknown number of enemy dead inside. On 28 Feb [26 Feb. The typed manuscript says 28 March, and was hand-corrected by the author to 28 Feb.] a tremendous explosion at MONKEY POINT was the direct cause of 196 American casualties, 52 of whom were killed. On this occasion a Sherman tank had stopped in the near vicinity of the main charge and when the charge detonated, was blown end over end for hundreds of feet. The fact that one member of the crew survived this experience, uninjured except for shock, is recorded as one of those miracles that do occur. [The crewmember was, in truth, badly injured.]  

The 503d RCT was withdrawn from CORREGIDOR on 6 March to prepare for another mission scheduled for about 5 April.
 

10. Statistical Data: In addition to the statistics given on casualties for 16 February, the following tabular summaries are furnished:

a. Casualties

   (1) Enemy -

  Counted dead

4773

 

Believed dead or escaped by swimming

976

 

Prisoners of War

24

 

Total casualties

5773

 

Unaccounted for

74

 

Estimated strength as of 16 February

5847

                                                     
(2) Own -

 

 

KIA&DOW

WOUNDED

SICK

INJURED

TOTAL

 

 

O

EM

O

EM

O

EM

O

EM

 

 

503d RCT

17

148

17

267

7

57

15

316

841

 

Other Units

1

44

5

158

1

44

0

8

264

 

Totals

18

192

22

425

8

101

15

324

1105

 

(3) Percentages -

 

Officers

503d RCT

Other Units

 

Enlisted men

28.2%

9.1%

 

 

28.4%

16.9%

Deducting 222 jump casualties, the 503d suffered 619 casualties in battle, of which 246 were the direct result of explosions set off by suiciding Japs.

 

 

 

10

 

b. Equipment and Supply Recoveries: Losses in equipment and supplies, air dropped, including those falling into enemy hands:

(1) Radios

 

Type

Dropped

Recovered

Useable

 

 

 

 

 

 

SCR 284

5

3

3

 

SCR 694

2

2

2

 

SCR 536

85

76

70

 

SCR 610

29

20

17

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total

121

101

92

(2) Weapons

 

Type

Dropped

Recovered

Useable

 

 

 

 

 

 

LMG

27

17

17

 

81mm Mort

8

4

4

 

2.36� Rocket

14

12

12

 

.50 cal HMG

24

21

21

 

75mm How

15

12

9

 

Flame Throwers

18

14

9

 

 

 

 

 

Damage incurred by 75mm Howitzers was, in three cases, ruined front trails, and one could not at once be put into action because of missing parts.

Of the 24 .50 cal HMG's dropped, two fell into enemy hands and were put into action. They were destroyed by 75mm fire at short range.

 

(3) Ammunition

 

Type

Dropped

Recovered

Useable

 

 

 

 

 

 

75mm

2200

1760

1320

 

Flamethrower fuel
(5 gal cans)

16

13

13

 

 

 

 

 

(4) General Items

 

Type

 

Recovered

Useable

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rations, etc

 

90%

75%

 

Water (1250 gals � 5 gal containers)

 

60%

60%

 

Small arms arms � all types

 

80%

70%

 

Engineer tools

 

100%

100%

 

Demolitions (including 90 demolition kits � Parachutists, shaped charges and Bangalores. Total 3120 pounds

 

100%

100%