The Callender Report

c: Ammunition Expenditures: 16 February to 22 February.

(1) One unit of fire was taken in on the initial drop. A half unit of fire was delivered by aerial re-supply. Ammunition stocks thereafter were drawn from beach landed supplies.

(2) Small Arms and Weapons

Item	Rounds

.30 Cal 8 rd clip (AP)	39,938
.30 Cal. 5 rd clip (Ball)	26,890
.30 Cal Carbine	38,285
.30 Cal 250 rd Web Belt	52,750
.45 Cal Pistol TSMfl	22,920
.50 Cal MG	55,245
60mm Mortar (M49A2)	1,934
60mm Mortar, (Ill)	132
81mm Mortar (M43A1) Light	874
81mm Mortar.:(M56). Heavy	1,042
81mm Mortar (M57) VIP	82
Rocket, 2.36" (M60)	34,7
Rocket, 2.3 6^,, (T-26E1) WP	80
Grenade, Rifle, AT	^.305
Grenade, Hand, Frag,MkII	1,989
Grenade, WP, M-15	1,015
Grenade, Smoke, M-8	25
Grenade, Smoke, Colored	75

(3) Artillery, 75mm Pack Howitzer

Date	AP	HE	Time	S-WP	Total

16 Feb	0	4	0	0	4
17 Feb	20	8	0	19	47
18 Feb	137	111	40	58	346
19 Feb	142	168	0	146	456
20 Feb	69	132	22	136	359
21 Feb	71	246	26	12	355
22 Feb	6	230	50	58	344

Total	445	899	138	329	3,221
Percent	20.4	41.4	6.2	15.3	100.0

- COMBAT OBSERVATIONS �

11. Parachute Infantry Unit Organization:

a. The Table of Organization under which the 503d is organized is a provisional table which differs in many respects from the WD T/0 & E 7-37, 1 August 44, of the Parachute Infantry Rifle Company.

T/O & E 7-37, 1 August 44, reflects the concept of the platoon as the tactical unit for drop and ground action, the platoon being organized into two rifle squads with two light machine guns each, and a 60mm mortar section. The provisional T/O & E (USAFFE) organizes the company as does T/O & E 7-37 into three rifle platoons but provides three rifle squads of 10 men each with a BAR in each squad. The 60mm mortars are placed in a mortar platoon of three squads of 7 ^.men each. All light machine guns are assigned to the Battalion Headquarters Company with an increase from four to six LMG squads and a corresponding increase from eight to twelve LMG�s. This type of organization has been in effect for approximately eighteen months and no change is contemplated.

Points to be considered in comparing the provisiona1 T/O & E described with T/O & E 7-37 are:

(1) The BAR in the rifle squad provides a base of fire which can be rapidly maneuvered, its ammunition ex�penditure is not as heavy as that of the LMG, and it can be carried by the parachutist rather than having to be dropped.

(2) Combat employment in this theater appears to indicate the desirability of having the LMG's in the battalion headquarters and the 60mm mortars in company headquarters.

NOTE: Provisional T/O & E's (USAFFE) are shown on charts 1, 2 and 3.

12. Parachute Field Artillery

a. The 75mm pack howitzers dropped on CORREGIDOR aided materially in the conduct of the operation and were considered indispen�sable. It is very possible that this weapon can be replaced by the 75mm recoilless rifle and the 4.2 recoilless mortar.

b. The radio equipment of Parachute Field Artillery appears to need considerable reduction in weight. The SCR-610 is eminently suitable from every point of view except that of long hand-carry.

13. Parachute Engineers:

a. Employment: The 161st Parachute Engineer Company came in on the first lift as part of the 3d Battalion CT. As other battalions of the regiment arrived a platoon was detached and attached to each battalion. Initial missions were almost entirely demolition. Engineer personnel were closely supported by infantry and good results were obtained with a minimum of casualties.

b. There appears to be some deficiencies in weapons in the engineer unit. For this particular type of operation it appears de�sirable to have an additional light automatic weapon per squad, either TSMG or Carbine M-2. These weapons are needed for the protection of men operating in close proximity to enemy positions. It might also be desirable to equip flamethrower personnel with the automatic pistol.

c. Additional Strength: As with all operations in the SWPA to date, the need for additional engineer personnel was evident. It might be desirable to increase the strength of the engineer company by one platoon. This would provide a general support platoon in addition to the one each now normally attached to battalions.

14. Replacements:

The 503d RCT has indicated that the replacements received from The Parachute School, at Ft. Benning, Ga. are superior in quality and training, are readily absorbed by the unit, and have performed as well as, and in some cases better than, the older men. The Regimental Commander and other officers have expressed their preference for replacement of this type to the exclusion of locally trained replacements or those furnished by transfer from other units. In addition, these officers do not view with favor any replacement training center conducted by the regiment owing to limited facilities and other conditions peculiar to the theater. It is believed that the personnel of parachute field artillery battalions must be basically infantry trained in order to be fully effective. Frequent instances of parachute field artillery personnel operating as infantry are on record.

15. Ammunition Types

a. Infantry: In the CORREGIDOR operation 40% of the grenades used wore WP. Approximately the same percentage of WP mortar ammunition would have been employed had it been available. The nature of the oper^ation influenced these percentages to a great extent.

b. Arti1lery : Ammunition taken in on the drop was broken down into 60% HE, 30 WP, and 10% AP. The CORREGIDOR operation indicates that the percentages actually required were 50% HE, 40% WP, and 10% AP. It is the opinion of artillery personnel of the 503d RCT that for operation in broken terrain the percentages should be 40% HE, 30% WP, 20% Time, and 10% AP. Canister was not available but was wanted.

15. Individual Equipment:

a. Helmets Parachutist: The helmet Ml with liner, para�chutist Ml and chin cup or helmet M1C (Parachutist) is considered essential for parachute troops, and is entirely satisfactory in design.

b. Parachute Boots: The combat boot is not regarded as satisfactory for parachutists:

(1) The combat boot does not provide sufficient protec�tion or stiffening for the ankle and foot:

(2) The projecting straps of the combat boot become snagged or entangled in risers in the air or upon landing.

c. Parachute Jump Suits: These are not considered suitable for this theater by reason of color, cut, type of material, and construction. Preference is shown by paratroopers for the one piece HBT coverall.

d. Pack, Combat, Cargo and Suspenders, 1944: This assembly is regarded as very satisfactory for parachute troops. Two suggestions have been received for a slight modification of this equipment as follows:

(1) Provide a grenade carrying loop or strap on the suspenders.

(2) Put eyelets in the web connector between the two segments of the cartridge belt to enable the wearer to carry articles on the belt in this region.

e. Quick Release Device - Parachute Harness: A quick release device which does not require the abandonment of the reserve chute is very desirable. The high wind velocity and rough terrain encountered on CORREGIDOR resulted in a great many men becoming thoroughly entangled with suspension lines upon landing. This necessitated cutting. In this connection, the parachutist jump knife should be issued as part of parachute equipment.

17. Parachute Storage and Maintenance: It was personally ob�served by observers that six men resorted to the use of the reserve chute in the CORREGIDOR jump, and that three additional men were killed as the result of malfunctions. These malfunctions included one broken static line. In addition to this there was much loss of equipment by reason of cargo chute malfunctions as well as container malfunction. This would indicate that the maintenance factor for this theater should be placed at a much higher figure than has been normally contemplated