The Callender Report

or that special equipment should be provided for parachute maintenance. It is known that every effort has been made by parachute units in this theater to accomplish proper maintenance, seriously effected by tropical conditions. It is believed that portable structures could be provided and that a type of packing box could be designed for use as a storage bin when stacked with similar containers. Due to the scarcity of suitable material the construction of temporary structures for parachute storage and preservation is a most difficult problem. These containers should be moisture-proof, durable enough to withstand water shipment and incident rough handling, and the rigors of climate in the open. The conditions that obtain and the lack of suitable storage structures or containers has resulted in an abnormally high expenditure of Parachute assemblies. The 503d RCT has had a turn-over in stock of 15,600 personnel assemblies and 4,200 cargo parachutes. There remains on hand as serviceable after inspection and repacking about 3,000 personnel assemblies and 300 cargo parachutes.

18. Artillery Paracrates:

a. Based on observations in the CORREGIDOR operation too many rounds of artillery ammunition are rendered unserviceable in a drop. It is believed that a high percentage of this loss could be avoided by providing a suitable artillery ammunition paracrate. In this connection, 2200 rounds of 75mm ammunition were dropped, 1760 rounds were recovered, and 1320 rounds, or 75% of the amount recovered was usable. Many additional rounds were damaged by the rough landing but were serviceable.

b. The present type of gun paracrate prevents the drop of other than the MlAl with M8 carriage. A paracrate to take the MI carriage might prove desirable. The control ground pattern as developed by the Airborne Command was used with two modifications:

(1) The front trail (Paracrate Ml) was ejected from the door in pace of the M9 ammunition caisson.

(2) The M9 ammunition paracaisson was carried in and dropped from the pararack.

"Daisy-chaining" is not satisfactory from less than 600 feet and to employ this type of drop for equipment bundles requires a shortening of the static lines or the bundles must be thrown free, each with its static line hooked in the plane.

19. Parachute Drop Control: The CORREGIDOR operation again confirms the desirability of drop control being performed by personnel on the ground rather than in the air. The rapid shifting of an air observation point introduces errors which are too great to be dismissed as inconsequential. The pathfinder technique, developed by the Airborne Command has proven to be efficient and greatly preferred to control from the air. In the CORREGIDOR mission pathfinder personnel could have preceded the actual drop by more than thirty minutes and this margin of time would have permitted a set-up which it is believed would have greatly lessened the number of men who landed outside the drop-zones and the lost equipment. It will be noted that neither parachute landing center of impact was on the fields and that only about 80% of the personnel dropped actually landed on TOPSIDE. (See Overlay 1) It is conceded that the nature of the mission and the conditions likely to be encountered on the ground precluded test drops of dummies prior to the actual drop and did not appear to warrant the use of pathfinder personnel in the accepted sense of the word but the fact remains that, if pathfinder personnel had been included in the initial sticks, they could have been used to better advantage than was the air control system adopted.

This statement does not imply criticism of the selection of method but rather, intends to point out the desirability of ground rather than air control.

20. American Red Cross: It is desired to record here that the ARC man , in person of Mr. Harold M. Templeton, jumped with the initial drop and provided invaluable aid and assistance for the men of the RCT. By 1140 on the 16th of February, he had his canteen established_, and was supplying hot drinks for the injured and wounded. It is noted that Mr. Templeton is a qualified parachutist, is voluntarily with the 503d RCT, and does not draw parachute pay. Great credit is due the individual and the American Red Cross.

21. Conclusions:

a. The operation was made possible by a high standard of individual and unit training and a condition of mental and physical toughness of the highest order. The essential prerequisite was careful planning which was accomplished. The operation is especially notable by reason of the difficulties to be overcome, forcing the acceptance of risks much greater than normally contemplated. The success of the operation indicates that the use of the aerial descent is feasible under conditions of terrain that have heretofore been regarded as impossible. From this it might appear that the main consideration in any descent is tactical.

b. The superior performance of all ranks indicates that the efforts expended in selection, qualifying, and training of these troops has been fully justified. While it is recognized that special formations of this type are extremely brittle when exposed to the rigors of combat, they constitute a threat and, on many occasions, a tool of inestimable value when intelligently used.

c. The achievement of these troops is more adequately described by quoting the words of the Commanding General, XI Corps, under date^. of 9 March 1945:

"This RCT came under my command upon its landing on CORREGIDOR. I observed it intimately throughout the operation. The job, in my opinion, was the best handled of any that I have seen during my military career. Both officers and enlisted men were thoroughly competent, knew what there was to do and did not hesitate in any instance to close with the enemy and do it. After the landing, the reduction of CORREGIDOR required carefully planned and methodical work. Throughout the operation there was the most careful planning and fine execution of the methodical attack made to clear the island of Nips. The organization clearly showed that it had been well trained, that its personnel was of a high type, and that it was willing and anxious to fight.

�I would welcome this organization in any command which I might hold and for any job, ground or airborne.�

For the COMMANDING GENERAL:

JAMES A CALLENDER
Captain, A. G. D.
Asst. Adj. General