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I. GENERAL PLAN
1.
Factors precluding early planning
It is recognized that proper plans for the capture of a built -up area
call for careful estimates of the situation based on detailed study of the
city itself, and of enemy dispositions within and without it. The plans
should comprise initial seizure within the city of area which gives
advantage to the attacker in observation, fields of fire, means of
communication, and which works to the disadvantage of the enemy in
reducing his combat effectiveness and preventing or hindering his escape.
Afterwards a general advance through the built-up area should be made.
Formulating such plans for the capture of Manila was greatly influenced by
several factors attributable not only to the enemy defense but also to
special circumstances.
Initially, the plan of the XIV Corps in attacking Manila was complicated
by several factors. Although to the U. S. Forces marching South from
Lingayen Gulf the capture of the port of Manila at an early date was very
necessary, in the early stages of the battle virtually all effort was
directed to liberating American prisoners of war and Allied internees whom
the enemy held at Santo Tomas University and at Bilibid Prison in North
Manila. Special effort was also made to secure the vital installations of
the water system. Advance elements of the XIV Corps came down from the
North with great speed and drove rapidly into Manila, liberating the
prisoners before the enemy could harm them. This drive resulted, however,
not only in freeing the prisoners but also in securing virtually the whole
of North Manila.
Another factor which prevented early planning was the difficulty in
determining the location of main enemy dispositions within the city, or
even if they existed. The Japanese defense of Manila comprised a strongly
held core, the Intramuros, with its nearby fortified buildings, and
surrounding this core, several isolated fortified localities. Units
searched the city thoroughly as they went, yet struck nothing very
formidable until reaching the center of the enemy defense. This rendered
very difficult properly estimating the situation until major friendly
forces were in contact with the bulk of the enemy.
2. Estimate of the Situation
Before U. S. Forces struck the main line of enemy resistance in Manila
there was almost nothing on which to base an estimate. After solid contact
was made at the Pasig River, the rigidity of the enemy defenses on the far
bank tended to force the plan of action into the elementary expedient of
crossing further upstream and attacking the enemy in flank.
3. Plan for the attack
The XIV Corps, having secured North Manila to the Pasig River with two
divisions abreast, the 37th Infantry Division on the right and the 1st
Cavalry Division on the left, planned to move the 1st Cavalry Division and
two regiments of the 37th Infantry Division Eastward, effect with this
force a double crossing of the Pasig River, and attack Westward with
divisions abreast against enemy fortifications in the Intramuros area. One
regiment of the 37th Infantry Division was to move directly across the
Pasig River and attack enemy positions on the South bank.
4. Conduct of the attack
The 37th Infantry Division (less one regiment) moved eastward through
North Manila, crossed the Pasig River and attacked West toward the enemy
held Intramuros. The remaining regiment of the 37th Infantry Division held
the river line directly across the Pasig from Intramuros. The 1st Cavalry
Division, abandoning contact with the 37th Infantry Division, executed a
wide wheeling movement inland and swept into Manila from the Southeast.
This maneuver actually worked somewhat to the detriment of the overall
attack, as it permitted a very strong center of enemy resistance, the
Makati Circle area, to survive for days directly between the divisions, a
thorn in the side of each. In this respect it is believed that by-passing
too many strong isolated Japanese centers of resistance is a mistake, as
the number of troops necessary to contain the Japanese will far exceed the
number of Japanese contained. When Japanese Forces are deployed in rigid
defense, it is considered advisable to destroy all enemy as the attack
progresses. When it is advisable to by-pass centers of resistance, such
centers of resistance should be reduced immediately, employing available
reserves. If sufficient reserves are not immediately available, progress
of the attack should be controlled by phase lines until strong points are
eliminated.
Nevertheless, elements of the XIV Corps closed in on Central Manila and
attacked the Japanese prepared defenses of which Intramuros was the hub.
The fighting which resulted in the destruction of these defenses and the
final elimination of enemy resist! ance in Manila was in reality that
which characterizes the attack of a fortified locality, and for discussion
may be divided into three categories, namely normal fighting in city
streets, the reduction of strong earthquake proof buildings, and the
attack upon the ,Walled City (Intramuros). The fighting did not fall
together chronologically into these categories, as several strong
enemy-held buildings were contained and by-passed to permit the assault
upon Intramuros, and within Intramuros itself normal street fighting
was resumed.
5. Limitations on bombing and artillery fires
As it was desired to capture Manila as intact as possible, and since a
large fraction of the civil population was still inside the city when U.
S. Forces attacked, bombing of Manila or any part of it was forbidden, and
the use of artillery fire against enemy fortifications was greatly
restricted. Initially, sections of the city were attacked by Infantry,
using small arms. Artillery fire was restricted to counter-battery and to
observed fire on known enemy strong points. The casualty rate was alarming
and the attack was slowed up to a point where more powerful measures were
required. These measures consisted of attaching tanks, tank destroyers,
and 4.2" mortars to the infantry, and a greater use of field artillery.
However, as the main line of Japanese resistance was reached, it became
apparent that destruction of the buildings in the path of advancing troops
was essential. Artillery fire was still restricted to known Japanese
positions but so many enemy riflemen were interspersed within the
positions that artillery area fire immediately in front of the advancing
troops became the rule rather than the exception. A general overall
program of destruction by artillery fire was never employed. Japanese
heavy mortars, 20 and 40mm guns, and even large caliber artillery were
found in city buildings. The combination, therefore, of counterbattery
(directed from observation posts and by plane spot), together with
close-in fires in support of the advancing infantry resulted in almost
total destruction of the defended areas.
