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	  6.  Assault 
	  on Intramuros 
	  
	    
	  
	  The assault upon Intramuros was unique. A thick masonry wall averaging 20 
	  feet in thickness surrounded Intramuros. Extensive gun emplacements and 
	  tunnels in the wall itself had been constructed by the Japanese. Maximum 
	  use was made of the apparently impregnable cover to protect enemy 
	  defensive installations. The assault upon it was characterized by a 
	  prodigious use of direct fire artillery, tanks, tank destroyers, and 
	  overhead artillery fire for one hour prior to the attack. In the final 
	  assault of the WaIled City, the 145th Infantry Regiment used an entire 
	  company of medium tanks, an entire company of tank-destroyers, a special 
	  assault-gun platoon, two flame thrower tanks, and the regimental M-7's 
	  from the Cannon Company plus an additional platoon from the 148th 
	  Infantry. Artillery pieces up to and including 155mm howitzers were used 
	  in direct fire missions also, but their particular vulnerability to small 
	  arms fire precluded their extensive use. Great difficulty was had in 
	  getting direct fire weapons across the Pasig River and into position 
	  because of the intensity of enemy fire. The whole attack on Intramuros was 
	  delayed until the heavy assault guns could be brought over and placed into 
	  battery. The main purpose of the direct fire was to breach the walls, and 
	  two places were selected where the masonry was to be opened. Such was the 
	  organization of fire that each gun had its own part of the area in the 
	  wall to be destroyed. The hour's bombardment, however, did not open the 
	  wall cleanly, but rather crumbled it so that foot troops could climb over 
	  without having to use ladders. When the breaches were made, one at the 
	  North end of the city and the other at the Northeast corner, the assault 
	  units moved in.
	   
	  
	    
	  
	  The 129th Infantry attacked across the Pasig River from the North in 
	  assault boats (after shooting steps into the river embankment with 76mm 
	  tank destroyers), while the 145th Infantry attacked overland from the 
	  West. So heavy was the preparation, that entrance was gained almost 
	  without opposition. Once our units were inside Intramuros, normal street 
	  fighting again took place, except in Fort Santiago. This was a medieval 
	  fort, containing many dungeons and deep recesses and tunnels, filled with 
	  Japanese. Among the expedients found workable in combating the enemy 
	  therein was the sealing of deep cavities by demolition teams. The 
	  extinction of other pockets to which access was difficult was effected by 
	  pouring gasoline into them and igniting it with WP grenades. 
	  
	  
	    
	  
	   
	  
	  The Parian Gate was one of the 7 gates of Intramuros - so named as it 
	  was the only portal by which the Chinese - parias (Hindu for "outcasts") - 
	  could enter and leave Intramuros.  The Parian Gate was, after 1765, 
	  the gate the new governor officially entered the city and received the 
	  keys.  
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
  
  	
	  7. Special Techniques 
	  
	  a. Observation Posts in Street Fighting 
	  
	   
	  
	  In some cases it was very helpful to have an observation post in a high 
	  building some distance to the rear of the attacking units, with direct 
	  communication to the attackers. Because of the limited visibility in many 
	  cases this rear CP was able to observe and report to the attacking company 
	  actions and locations of the enemy. In closein fighting, the attacking 
	  companies should have the SCR 300 channel number of the adjacent units, so 
	  that in an emergency direct communication may be established by switching 
	  to the appropriate channel. This means is recommended only for emergencies 
	  or situations where the information might become worthless after a few 
	  minutes ; for example, enemy escaping from a strongpoint. 
	  
	  b. Use of Flame-throwing Tanks 
	  
	  In one instance, Japanese held the second floor of a building and 
	  commanded the stairways by the use of hand grenades thrown from sandbagged 
	  positions out of sight. A flame-throwing tank was brought into the doorway 
	  and maneuvered into position to shoot flame up the stairs into enemy 
	  defenses. The Japanese were driven out and the assault troops siezed the 
	  stairs. On another occasion a flame-throwing tank discharged its flame 
	  through a window into a deeply recessed and sandbagged machine gun 
	  position, destroying the enemy. 
	  
	  c. Effect of Unfused Projectiles on Walls 
	  
	  Considerable advantage was thought to be gained by the use of unfuzed 
	  155mm HE shells for the purpose of opening holes in heavy walls. While the 
	  ballistic properties are not noticeably different without the fuze, 
	  observers agreed that the initial penetration with unfuzed shells created 
	  a more pronounced fissure than was caused by the use of HE with fuze 
	  delay. This fissure responded readily to subsequent use of HE with fuze 
	  delay. 
	  
	   d. Night Operations 
	  
	  Night attacks through the rubble and debris of a defended city are 
	  extremely difficult and hazardous. The many hiding places make it 
	  impossible to keep from bypassing Japanese who have to be hunted out the 
	  next day. Movement is difficult and silence is almost impossible. Any 
	  attacks made at night in the city should be local and against known 
	  positions and terrain. Attacks against buildings should not be launched 
	  after 16001 . The enemy had the distinct advantage of being in the dark 
	  while our troops were definitely silhouetted when approaching the 
	  building. Also the large number of mines used by the Japanese in Manila 
	  made night movements extremely dangerous. Moves of a minor nature are 
	  desirable and advantageous, but large-scale and continuous moves should be 
	  avoided. Usually the danger of disaster involved is too great to 
	  compensate for the advantages gained. 
	  
	    
	  
	  8. Conclusions 
	  
	  a. Street fighting in Manila was normal and advanced no principles or 
	  tactics not already covered in FM 31-50. 
	  
	  b. The stubborn Japanese defense of large fortified buildings standing in 
	  open ground necessitated use of combined tactics of assault on fortified 
	  positions and combat in towns, in order to secure their reduction. 
	  
	  c. The unique situation of assaulting a medieval rampart presented itself. 
	  Large numbers of assault guns and artillery pieces including those of 
	  medium caliber were laboriously and dangerously emplaced within close 
	  range of the rampart, and only after employing direct fire and heavy 
	  bombardment did the guns succeed in driving the defenders from the walls 
	  and opening breeches for assaulting troops. 
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	    
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