"CONCERNING SCHOOL SOLUTIONS AND HISTORICAL INACCURACY"
_________________
William T. Calhoun and
Paul F. Whitman |
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL MONOGRAPHS
After
the war, a number of officers who had served in the 503d attended the Advanced
Officers Course at Ft. Benning. Not
surprisingly, some wrote their course monographs reflecting upon their personal
503d PRCT experiences. Some illustrated their experiences on
Corregidor. Although their monographs deserve careful consideration, they were part
of a specific assessment process, and were not written for the purposes
of creating historical documents of record. They were written specifically to bring out tactical principles
which were being studied, and there was no weighing of tactical
principals against historical accuracy.
The result does not, repeat not, create a balanced and accurate
source of history.
As those
who attended the
Infantry
School
will always remember, the bottom line is the ‘school solution.’ Some accounts of fire support and attack can be
added or altered in order to bring out tactical principles. The Authors of these
reports cannot
be faulted from writing to the ‘school solution,’
- though in doing so,
some egregious embellishments, hearsay speculations and fanciful episodes can and did creep in.
These monographs are not the primary documentation of history and
were never meant to be. It must follow that their contents
should not
be allowed to form that history. Read them for background and familiarity by all
means, and for the military and command principles that they contain - but recognize they are flawed as historical
sources, and never quote
them as such.
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"OPERATIONS OF THE 503d PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THE ATTACK
ON CORREGIDOR
ISLAND ,
16 FEBRUARY - 2 MARCH 1945"
by Maj.
Lester H. LeVine.
Personal Experience of a Regimental
Adjutant, which emphasizes operational perspectives. |
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"OPERATIONS OF 503D PARACHUTE REGIMENTAL COMBAT
TEAM IN THE CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR ISLAND ,
16 FEBRUARY - 2 MARCH 1945"
by Capt. Donald A.
Crawford
Personal Experience of a Regimental
Assistant S-1, which emphasizes the planning perspectives of the
operation. |
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"THE
OPERATION OF COMPANY ”E”, 503D PARACHUTE REGIMENT
AT
WHEELER POINT ON 23 FEBRUARY 1945"
by Capt. Hudson Hill
Accuracy problems concerning the
'school solution' render this paper unreliable as a historical source.
The paper is not supported by the eyewitnesses, especially concerning
the attack upon Battery Monja and the death of Lt. Emery Ball.
These concerns are expressed in
The Lost Road.
A
special commentary on Capt. Hill's map illustrations is available.
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"OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND BATTALION ON CORREGIDOR"
by
Lt. Edward T. Flash
Severe accuracy problems concerning the
operations by E Company at Wheeler Point, particularly where it relies on the
"Personal Knowledge of Capt. Hill." Entirely wrong when
it announces the taking of the battery at Wheeler Point, which was never
taken. |
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"OPERATIONS OF THE ROCK FORCE
(503D NOT REINFORCED) IN THE RECAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR"
by Capt. Magnus L. Smith
Worthwhile reading on the coordination
involved, though skims over the details of actions beyond the immediate
sight of Regimental HQ at Topside Barracks, particularly the negative
ones. His report that on the evening of the 20th there was an
intelligence appraisal " there were no Japs to oppose our forces from Wheeler Pt to Searchlight Pt.,"
goes towards establishing why Rock Force HQ took its eye off the ball on
Topside.
Similarly, the consideration that surrender leaflets might be an effective
tool highlights a further tendency towards unreality. |