was as fine an example of discipline and training as I have ever
MacArthur, September 5, 1943
Success of the 7th Australian Division's attack on the port
city of Lae depended on the possession of the airstrip at Nadzab to
allow the division to air-land. Before the war, transport and small
passenger aircraft used the airstrip for emergency landings. Just to
the south on the Markham River was the Gabmatzung Mission, run by the
German Lutherans. From Gabmatzung, the Markham Road ran twenty-five
miles southeast to the port city of Lae, New Guinea. Nadzab was
important not only for the airstrip, but also its location along the
Markham River Valley to the west of the Huon Peninsula. The Markham
and Ramu Rivers were the two major waterways on the island of New
Guinea. The Markham ran southeast to the Huon Gulf at Lae, and the
Ramu ran northwest to the Hansa Bay between Wewak and Madang. These
two rivers formed a valley that separated the Huon Peninsula from the
remainder of New Guinea. The valley made an easy passage to the
Japanese bases of Wewak and Madang along the northern coast of New
Guinea (see figs. 5 and 7). Capturing this key terrain at Nadzab
would block that valley route, while possession of the airstrip would
give the Fifth Air Force another forward base to support its air
campaign against Rabaul and Wewak.
On August 24, both MacArthur and Kenney arrived at Port Moresby to be
present for the final stages of the planning and for the execution of
the operation. Several days after MacArthur's arrival, he surprised
Vasey with a trip to his headquarters. The two seemed to get along
well together and agreed on the concept and details of the operation.
Their only disagreement was over Japanese troop strength at Lae.
Vasey placed the number at close to 5,000, while Herring's staff put
it at nearly 7,000. MacArthur thought it was much smaller, around
1,400. While the actual strength was about 2,000, MacArthur had the
advantage of having information gained through signal intelligence
available to only the very senior commanders.
The 7th Australian Division published its operations order
on August 27. The intent of the operation was to secure Nadzab in
order to conduct offensive operations against Lae and to prevent the
Japanese from sending reinforcements up the Markham Valley.
The tasks given to the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment
were as follows:
Capture area Nadzab - Gabmatsung - Gabsonkek on Z-Day -- object
covering preparation of a landing strip.
Establish road block across Markham Valley Rd. in area of junc. Rd and
track 445546 -- object preventing enemy movement into Nadzab along
Prepare landing strip on site of present Nadzab emergency landing
field with utmost speed.
MacArthur had not established the date for the operation when the 7th
Australian Division published its order. The final date did not come
until September 1 when Kenney made his recommendation to MacArthur
based on the weather forecasts. Z-Day was one day after the 9th
Australian Division's amphibious assault to the east of Lae.
On August 29, one week before the operation, Kinsler assembled his
three battalion commanders and staff at his regimental headquarters to
brief them on the mission to drop on, seize and hold the abandoned
airstrip at Nadzab. They would link-up with Australian engineers who
would upgrade the strip to permit the landing of the 7th
Australian Division. The division would then attack Lae from the west
while the 503d PIR continued to secure the Nadzab airstrip.
Kinsler assigned Britten the task of jumping his First Battalion
directly onto the airstrip and clearing it of all enemy troops,
although the intelligence reports indicated that there were very few
in the area. In addition, the battalion was responsible for starting
the preparation of the airstrip until relieved by the Australian
engineers. Next Kinsler directed Jones to jump his Second Battalion
north of the airstrip to secure Gabsonkek and provide flank protection
for First Battalion. Last, he assigned Tolson's Third Battalion to
jump east of the airstrip and the secure the village of Gabmatzung.
This was the enemy's most likely avenue of approach if the Japanese
opposed the landing from the garrison at Lae. This was not likely,
however, because the Japanese units at Lae would have their hands full
defending against the 9th Australian Division attacking
them from the east.
The 503d PIR did not have any attached or organic
artillery. To make up for the shortage of firepower, MacArthur's
headquarters provided two "cut-down" twenty-five pound artillery
sections with thirty-one personnel from the Australian 2/4th
Field Regiment. The only problem was that the Australian gunners had
never seen parachutes. Lieutenant Robert W. Armstrong, from First
Battalion, had the responsibility of training the volunteers in the
basic skills of jumping from an aircraft. The gunners also learned
how to disassemble the artillery pieces and pack them in separate
containers, each attached to the other with webbing (known as the
ground control pattern) in order to facilitate recovery and expedite
assembly on the ground. This was essentially the same procedure used
for dropping the American 75mm pack howitzer.
On August 30, the gunners made their one and only practice jump with
one of their guns under the watchful eyes of Vasey and their
regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Blyth. It was such a
success, that they earned the right to go in with the 503d
PIR on its first combat jump. The Aussies were not actually going to
jump with the regiment, but they would do so one hour after the
initial airborne operation. Four airplanes arrived at Port Moresby on
September 4 to transport the Australian gunners and "baby 25
pounders." They loaded their guns and flew the same day to
Tsili-Tsili in preparation for the next day's jump.
Kinsler, his three battalion commanders, and several regimental staff
officers made a reconnaissance flight over the jump area in a B-17 on
August 30. This flight proved valuable because they were able to view
the proposed jump areas, check points and surrounding areas. Even
more importantly, they were able to determine the prevailing winds
near the jump areas. The meteorological reports stated that winds in
the Markham Valley were unusual: they blew down the valley until 1100
hours daily and then suddenly changed and blew up the valley. This
proved to be exactly the case.
On September 1, Kinsler met with all the company commanders in the
regiment. He gave them an overview of the upcoming mission, but
wanted it kept a secret from the paratroopers. The men may have not
have known the details, but they saw the officers coming and going to
secret meetings as well as the continuous arrival of C-47s, so they
knew something important was about to happen. Meanwhile, they
conducted intense rehearsals and training for the upcoming mission,
attending classes on Japanese weapons, friendly aircraft
identification, demolitions methods, and land navigation.
Of course, there were also the occasional visitors who wanted to see
the 503d PIR. Vasey showed up to address the regiment and
tell the paratroopers how proud he was to have them with him. They
were struck by the bitter way he referred to "Dirty Little Nips" in
his "kill them all" speech.
Another visitor was MacArthur, who arrived with his corps of
photographers and had his picture taken with many members of the
The Fifth Air Force airmen also conducted extensive preparations
before the operation for their part. The 54th Troop
Carrier Wing, under the command of Colonel Paul H. Prentiss, was
responsible for airlifting the men to the target. After much planning
and preparation between the Fifth Air Force and the 503d
PIR staffs, they decided to use a formation of six planes staggered to
the right with thirty seconds between elements in order to reduce
chance of mid-air collisions while maximizing the widths of the drop
General Kenney was concerned about the vulnerability of the troop
carrier convoy along the route to Nadzab, so he and Whitehead
developed a very intricate air support plan for the operation. The
Fifth Fighter Command was responsible for furnishing fighter
protection along the way, as well as smoke and air support before,
during and after the parachute operation. The air plan had 100
fighter aircraft to protect the slow-moving and bunched up
transports. The air plan also had six squadrons of B-25s to strafe
and bomb the jump areas before the airborne operation. Just after the
B-25s, six A-20s would lay smoke across the jump areas to screen the
descending paratroopers. Kenney did not want to leave anything to
The Fifth Air Force practiced the entire mission for three straight
days starting on September 2. The pilots were veterans and knew all
the details of the three major jump areas -- one for each battalion.
Emphasis during rehearsals was on formation flying to ensure that the
entire 503d PIR landed accurately and together so that it
could quickly assemble and seize its assault objectives. The Fifth
even conducted a full-scale trial run over Rorona, an abandoned
airstrip thirty miles up the coast from Port Moresby. The fighter
protection fired before the troop carriers loaded with the entire 503d
PIR flew over the abandoned airstrip and some of the paratroopers
jumped to check the timing. The staffs corrected a few minor details
and everyone felt much more comfortable about the mission.
On September 3, Kinsler and the 503d PIR staff issued Field
Order 1. The four page base order described the plan for the
two-phase operation. The first phase was for the regiment to jump on
six separate drop zones in order to seize the emergency landing strip
at Nadzab (see fig. 8). In addition, the regiment would secure the
surrounding areas to deny any enemy infiltration (see fig. 9). The
second phase was to receive the 7th Australian Division
beginning the following day (see fig. 10).
The order contained no changes from Kinsler’s briefing to his
battalion commanders on August 29 or his company commanders on
September 1, but simply added many details. First Battalion had the
task of jumping onto Field “B” to capture and begin preparing the
Nadzab Emergency Landing Strip until relieved. Second Battalion’s
mission was to jump on Field "A" to capture the Gabonek area and deny
enemy infiltration from the north and northwest. Meanwhile, Third
Battalion was to jump onto Field “C” to capture the Gabmatzung area
and deny enemy infiltration from the east. The Regimental
Headquarters Company would assemble with First Battalion and prepare
the drop zone for the Australian artillery battery. Regimental
Service Company would also assemble with First Battalion and gather
and distribute equipment and supplies.
The regiment spent the remainder of the day completing
battalion orders and conducting rehearsals, as well as preparing the
company orders. The battalion commanders had the officers around
their sand tables one company at a time going over their missions. It
was not until September 4, the day before the jump, that company
commanders assembled their men and spelled out in detail their
missions. All day long, a platoon at a time gathered at the
regimental sand table where each soldier received a briefing on his
mission. The jumpmasters held the last meeting that night. The
leaders reviewed the whole mission and updated everyone on the latest
While the 503d PIR made its final preparations
on September 4, the 9th Australian Division landed twenty miles east of Lae against very light
opposition. Several Japanese bombers were able to get through and
attack the congested beaches. The bombers were able to damage two
ships and kill more than one hundred Australian and American seamen.
All through the night, as the members of the 503d PIR tried
to sleep, the 9th Australian Division continued to march on
Reveille was at 0300 hours on Sunday, September 5. The
paratroopers rapidly assembled in their battalion areas and nervously
ate the usual soggy pancakes covered with syrup. As they loaded on
the eighty-two trucks in the regimental area, the weather suddenly
turned and fog completely enveloped the departure airfield. To make
matters worse, a light rain began. It did not look like a good day
for a jump.
The movement to the two airstrips, Ward and Jackson, went like
clockwork. Each truck, numbered from one to eighty-two, corresponded
to the same numbered aircraft lined up on the field. The trucks were
in three serials – one for each battalion. The first serial moved to
the enplaning point and the other two followed at thirty-minute
intervals. Each truck, with twenty-two personnel and supply bundles,
proceeded to the airplane marked with its corresponding number.
At about 0730 hours, the rain suddenly stopped and the fog
rapidly dissipated. A weather plane surveying the saddle of the Owen
Stanley Mountain range gave an all-clear signal. The aircrews of the
C-47s began warming up their engines and the paratroopers started
putting on their parachutes and equipment. At 0825, the first C-47
rolled down the runway. Within fifteen minutes, three flights of
C-47s with the entire 503d PIR were in the air on its way
to Nadzab. The formation started for the jump areas led by MacArthur
in a B-17.
Several days before the operation, Kenney had discussed
with MacArthur the details for covering and supporting the Nadzab
operation. Kenney casually mentioned that he would be in one of the
bombers during the airborne operation to see how things were going.
MacArthur said that he did not think that Kenney should go. Kenney
responded with a series of reasons why he should go, concluding with
"they were my kids and I was going to see them do their stuff."
MacArthur reflected a moment. "You're right, George, we'll both go,”
he said. “They're my kids, too."
Kenney arranged for the "brass hat" flight of three B-17s
to fly just above and to one side of the troop carriers as they went
into Nadzab. In the first plane was MacArthur, in the second was
Kenney and Vasey rode in the third. MacArthur's only concern was that
his stomach might get upset when they hit the rough air going over the
mountains. He did not want to "get sick and disgrace himself in front
of the kids."
The armada of over 300 aircraft climbed to 9,000 feet to
cross over the saddle of Owen Stanley Mountains. The temperature
dipped, but not for long. The formation dropped to 3,500 feet as it
approached the secret airfield at Marilinan. The armada rearranged
the flight into three columns, each six airplanes wide. Thirty
minutes out from the jump areas, the crew chiefs and the jumpmasters
started opening the jump doors. Aboard one of the airplanes, the
sudden rush of wind caused the door to come loose from its hinges and
become lodged, blocking the exit – and aborting the mission for the
frustrated paratroopers on board. This was the only airplane that had
a problem and was not able to drop its contingent.
At the junction of the Watut and Markham Rivers, the troop
carriers made a right turn for Nadzab and dropped to an altitude of
400 feet. The weather then became very hot and humid at the low
altitude. The maneuvers of the airplanes and the bumpiness of the
flight began to produce some airsickness and paratroopers commenced to
fill the "honey buckets." By the time they reached Nadzab, they were
anxious for the green light.
At 1009 hours, the red lights came on and the paratroopers
began to stand and make final preparations for the airborne operation
while the bombing and strafing began at the jump fields. Six
squadrons of B-25 strafers flew at 1,000 feet; each had eight
.50-caliber machine guns in the nose and sixty fragmentation bombs in
each bomb bay. Immediately behind them were the six A-20s that laid
smoke across the jump areas as the last fragmentation bombs exploded.
At 1022 hours, the green lights came on across the C-47s. The
jumpmasters pushed the door bundles out of the airplanes, then they
went out right behind the bundles with twenty-one jumpers in rapid
succession. In four and a half minutes, the entire regiment was on
its way to the ground. The pilot's of 54th Troop Carrier
Wing, for the first time in the war, dropped a regiment of
paratroopers with pinpoint accuracy on its assigned jump areas.
Above the drop, MacArthur watched the operation, thrilled
at the sight of the parachutes clustered neatly on the jump areas.
After landing back at Port Moresby, Kenney recalled MacArthur’s
jumping up and down like a kid. "Gentlemen, that was as fine an
example of discipline and training as I have ever witnessed,"
the supreme commander exclaimed. Reflecting later on the operation,
he took keen pride in the precision drops. "One plane after another
poured out its stream of dropping men over the target field.
Everything went like clockwork . . . . [T]he vertical envelopment
became a reality,"
he wrote of that day. To his astonishment, he received the Air Medal
for having “personally led” the paratroopers and “skillfully directed”
Kenney sent a letter to the Chief of the Army Air Force
General H. H. Arnold describing the operation and his pride in his
airmen (see Appendix A). He also thought that everything had gone
smoothly until he landed and talked with the pilot of MacArthur's
B-17. What Kenney did not know was that during the operation an
engine had failed on Colonel Roger Ramey's B-17, and that Ramey had
recommended turning around. MacArthur, knowing that Kenney would
follow him back to Port Moresby, refused. MacArthur insisted that he
wanted to stay and see the show. The dead engine was on the far side
of Kenney's bomber, so he did not know until after they had landed and
Ramey told him of the incident.
The airborne operation went extremely well, but not
without tragic incident. Three paratroopers died during the airborne
operation, two falling to their deaths when their parachutes
malfunctioned and another landing atop a very tall teakwood tree and
then falling some sixty feet to the ground. In addition to the three
deaths, there were thirty-three minor injuries caused by rough
A small glitch also occurred with the jump by paratroopers
of Third Battalion. The first person to make the jump at Nadzab was
its commander, the 26-year-old Colonel Tolson, who thus became the
first American paratrooper to jump in a combat operation in the
Pacific. His battalion, leading the regiment into Nadzab, had the
mission of jumping on Field "C" and blocking the enemy on the east.
As Tolson approached the drop zone, he recognized where he was from
several reconnaissance flights with the Fifth Air Force's bomber runs
on Lae. He watched the red light go off, but then the navigator
failed to turn on the green light. Hesitating for a few seconds,
Tolson still jumped out and landed in the middle of the jump area.
Because of the delay, about half of Third Battalion landed in the
trees at the eastern end of the drop zone.
The remainder of the regiment dropped accurately, but the
paratroopers on the jump areas were no better off than those who
landed in the trees. The razor-sharp kunai grass, supposedly only
about four feet high, reached up to ten feet high and was thick with
jungle vines. The paratroopers, in suffocating heat, hacked their way
through with machetes and reached their assembly areas exhausted.
That was the only fight for the 503d PIR -- there was no
opposition on the ground. The paratroopers had caught the Japanese
totally by surprise.
Even if the Japanese had been at Nadzab, they probably would not have
survived the pre-assault fires from the Fifth Air Force. In Second
Battalion's area, a worn trail went from the jungle out onto their
jump area. The trail across the clearing was a tribute to the Fifth
Air Force. Every ten yards or so there was a new bomb crater.
There were also mishaps with the Australians. Within two
hours of the jump, all units had assembled, moved to their assigned
objectives and begun preparation of the landing strip. Everything
went basically according to the plan. First Battalion seized the
airstrip, Second Battalion blocked all approaches from the north and
Third Battalion sealed all approaches from the east.
One hour after the initial assault, the thirty-one Australian gunners,
led by their trainer, Lieutenant Armstrong, jumped into Nadzab with
their two artillery pieces. The guns, disassembled and packed in
padded bundles under the wings of the C-47s, dropped like parachute
bombs on the drop zone.
The whole group landed in a small area, but took almost three hours to
find the ammunition and all the pieces to one gun and put it into
operation. It was not until the next day when they found all the
pieces to the second gun. The Australian gunners became the first
parachute artillery in the Pacific.
There was, moreover, a change in plans for resupply. The
original plan called for eleven gliders to come in during the
afternoon with supplies and equipment, but because of the completely
unopposed parachute operation, immediate resupply proved unnecessary.
Blamey also canceled the glider phase because he had his doubts about
the reliability of the gliders and he knew that their pilots had
undergone only minimal training. The regiment did not go without
resupply, however, because three specially configured B-17s loaded
with supplies remained over the area during daylight hours for the
first two days of the operation. The modified B-17s had a platform in
the bomb bay to drop parachute supply bundles.
To assist the 503d PIR in preparing the airstrip at Nadzab,
there were two other Australian units -- the 2/6th Field
Company and the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion. The engineers and
pioneers arrived secretly at the Tsili-Tsili airstrip a week before
the operation. The units carefully disguised their mission by
occupying the surrounding jungle where the Aussies assembled their
equipment and began preparations for movement to Nadzab. Tsili-Tsili
was near the swift, but barely navigable Watut River that ran
northeast into the Markham River about twenty-five miles upstream from
The engineers from 2/6th Field Company had the task of
moving down the Watut and then down the Markham River to Nadzab on
twelve large collapsible boats with all their heavy gear necessary for
preparing the airstrip at Nadzab. The task was very dangerous because
both of the rivers had rapids and constantly changing sandbars. The
engineers planned for a possible 50 percent casualty rate, in men and
equipment, but lost only three boats and one man who drowned. They
arrived at their rendezvous point just south of Nadzab early in the
morning of September 4.
The pioneers from 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion had the difficult
task of moving sixty miles overland with a train of 800 natives. They
crossed mountains and swamps, as well as dealt with many of the jungle
annoyances such as heat and bees. On the morning of September 5, the
pioneers arrived at the south side of the Markham River across from
Nadzab and linked up with the engineers right on schedule. The
pioneers constructed a bridge from the engineer's collapsible boats.
Both units were able to watch the show as hundreds of aircraft and
many more parachutes filled the skies overhead. They witnessed the
greatest aerial caravan ever seen in the Pacific.
At 1800 hours, the engineers and pioneers linked up with
First Battalion and began clearing the landing strip, which was 1,500
feet, but overgrown from twelve months of inactivity. Working
throughout the night, they extended the runway to 3,300 feet by the
next morning. The first C-47 landed at Nadzab at 10:00 AM on
September 6 -- less than 24 hours after the jump.
By September 11, Prentiss' C-47s had carried in 420 planeloads of men
and equipment from the 7th Australian Division.
The 7th Australian Division pushed down the
Markham Valley to attack the Japanese at Lae from the west while the 9th
Australian Division pressed the attack from the east. With the
growing pressure on Lae, the reinforcements to Salamaua ended. The 5th
Australian Division and the American 41st Division occupied
Salamaua on September 13. Three days later, the 7th and 9th
Australian Divisions converged on Lae. Around noon, September 16,
Vasey sent a radio message to Kenney: "Only the Fifth Air Force
bombers are preventing me from entering Lae."
Vasey and his 7th Australian Division were the first to
enter Lae and win the bet.
Based on MacArthur's guidance, the
PIR stayed near Nadzab with a defensive mission around the
captured airstrip. Vasey did not employ the 503d PIR in
offensive operations because MacArthur did not want parachute troops
doing what regular infantry troops could do. MacArthur directed that
after relief by supporting troops, parachute units should be withdrawn
to prepare for future operations. With its mission complete on
September 17, the 503d PIR began to redeploy to Port
Moresby. By September 19, the entire regiment closed back on its base
There were ten thousand Japanese
troops in the Lae-Salamaua area before the Allied assault. According
to captured Japanese war records, one thousand Japanese troops died in
the first few days of fighting. Twenty-five hundred more died in the
defense of Lae and Salamaua. The remainder of the Japanese troops
withdrew northward along dense jungle trails, where another 600
perished from illness and exhaustion. In a postwar interview, the
intelligence officer of the Japanese Eight Army defending the
Lae-Salamaua area said that the 503d PIR airborne operation
at Nadzab had taken place where the Japanese had thought the enemy
would never attack. The operation nearly cut in half the retreating
elements of the Japanese 51st Division. The seizure of
Nadzab cut off the escape route through the Markham Valley and
forced the remainder of the Japanese to withdraw over the more
difficult jungle terrain to the north of Lae.
The Allied operation against Lae was a total success. It
was a brilliant employment of all available sources of firepower and
maneuver. The coordination of the feint against Salamaua, the
amphibious assault east of Lae with the airborne drop at Nadzab were
excellent examples of joint planning and operations. An additional
benefit of the Lae offensive was the capture of the Nadzab airstrip,
which gave Kenney another excellent forward base for attacks further
to the west and north. Nadzab soon became one of the largest Fifth
Air Force bases in New Guinea.
According to the Weapon System Evaluation Group's
definition for success, the Nadzab airborne operation was an
unqualified one. The air effort was an astounding success because the
combination of air support and accurate execution of the jump were
unprecedented. The degree of air superiority, a fundamental
prerequisite for a successful parachute drop, attained was a major
factor in determining whether it occurred during daylight or hours of
darkness. The Fifth Air Force successes against the Japanese Air
Force ensured the control of the skies that allowed the operation to
occur during daylight hours making it the first large-scale American
parachute drop conducted during hours of light. The daylight airborne
operations also allowed the Fifth Air Force to conduct an extensive
and accurate preparation of the objective area. Although there were
no Japanese in the Nadzab area, few would have survived the intense
preparation. The daylight operation also facilitated the accurate
drop of the entire regiment, which was the most accurate one to date.
The definition of success for the airborne effort was to
seize all of its objectives and held at the planned time. Again, this
was another remarkable success. Within two hours, the paratroopers
secured all their assault objectives and within twenty-four hours, the
airstrip was operational, all according to the plan.
The definition for success for the overall effort was that
the airborne operation accomplished its planned purpose, and the
success of the overall maneuver, measured in terms of the
accomplishment of ultimate purpose, was dependent on the performance
on the airborne forces. Again, the overall effort of the parachute
drop was markedly successful. The airborne operation allowed the 7th
Australian Division to seize Lae. Had it not been for the 503d
PIR, that division would have had to go over the rugged mountainous
terrain to get to Lae. This approach would have cost it much in terms
of time and combat power. And without the 7th, the 9th
Australian Division would not have been able to capture Lae
single-handedly. In addition to seizing the Nadzab airstrip, the 503d
PIR also blocked the Markham Valley from any Japanese reinforcements
The Nadzab airborne operation did not experience many of
the failures or poor employment principles that plagued earlier
parachute drops. Much of the doctrine for large-scale airborne
operations had not yet been written, so it is not possible to evaluate
the operation against doctrine. In any case, the Nadzab parachute
drop was well planned and executed. The principles of mass,
utilization as a theater level force, realistic and thorough joint
rehearsals, and air superiority were all present. The degree of air
superiority allowed the mission to take place during daylight hours,
which probably contributed substantially to the success of the air
effort of the airborne operation. The daylight parachute drop allowed
a precise placement of paratroopers not possible at night that
facilitated their quick assembly and seizure of their objectives.
The Nadzab parachute drop had a decisive impact on the
deliberations of the so-called Swing Board, the special panel chaired
by General Joseph Swing to evaluate the airborne operations in Sicily
for the Chief of Staff of the Army and recommend changes in training,
doctrine and employment principles. Indeed, the results of Nadzab
reported to Washington and Fort Bragg were welcome news in sharp
contrast to the operations in Sicily two months earlier. Although the
doctrine for large-scale airborne operations was still in development
during 1943, the examples of Sicily and Nadzab provided valuable
lessons that would shape basic doctrine. The Sicilian parachute drop
showed airborne enthusiast how not to conduct such an
operation. Nadzab, on the other hand, was an inspiring case study of
how vertical envelopment should be executed.
6 - THE
IMPACT OF NADZAB