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I. INTRODUCTORY
The following points are stressed in this report:
weapons used by the Japanese,
obstacles encountered, the integration of weapons and obstacles in
defensive organization, and tactics employed in small unit engagements by
both Allied and Japanese troops. In order to make the report as
comprehensive and as clear as possible, additional subjects, as listed in
the Index, have been included. Illustrations, sketches and pictures are in
the numbered Annexes.
II. GENERAL
The familiar fatalistic mental attitude on the part of the Japanese was as
apparent in city fighting as in combat in any other type of terrain where
this enemy has been encountered. He has been indoctrinated with the
offensive spirit to such an extent that, when forced to the defensive, his
only objective is to live as long as possible. His communications were
faulty; positions, while sometimes mutually supporting, did not provide
for continuous prepared areas behind which he might retire, nor a route of
withdrawal over which he might conduct the bulk of his forces to an
assembly area from which to launch an attack at an opportune time against
an enemy with extended lines of supply and communication. Thus he could
not be maneuvered out of his position, but had to be exterminated in
place. For example-prior to our advance on Manila enemy leaders directed
that supplies and equipment be buried near positions in which a last stand
would be made. Throughout the campaign suicidal attacks were ordered and
sick and wounded soldiers were directed to take their own lives. Nowhere
are there indications of any plan or attempt to withdraw the Manila Naval
Defense Force so that it might be preserved as a fighting unit in event of
the fall of the city
to American forces. Any deficiencies, however, in the plan adopted or
tactics employed were not reflected in the combat qualities of individual
soldiers and small groups. These fought tenaciously and skilfully, to the
bitter end, using all available weapons and barriers, natural and
artificial.
The main purpose of the enemy in defending Manila was threefold: first, to
effect maximum attrition of American fighting power by utilizing the
advantages of natural and man-made defenses within the city ; secondly, to
delay the occupation and utilization of the Port of Manila as long as
possible ; thirdly, to cripple the city as a base for future military
operations and as a center for civilian production and governmental
control. This third objective was covered in Manila Naval Defense Force
(MNDF) Order No. 43, dated 3 Feb., 1945, which reads in part as follows:
"1. The South, Central and North Forces must destroy the factories,
warehouses, and other installations and materiel being used by Naval and
Army forces, insofar as the combat and preparations of Naval forces in
Manila and of Army forces in their vicinity will not be hindered thereby.
"2. The demolition of such installations within the city limits will be
carried out secretly for the time being so that such actions will not
disturb the tranquility of the civil population nor be used by the enemy
for counter-propaganda. Neither large scale demolition nor burning by
incendiaries will be committed.
"3. A special order will be issued concerning the demolition of the water
system and the electrical installations."
Prior to the arrival of U. S. Army units in Manila, the enemy situation
was obscure. These things were apparent: the enemy in Manila and its
environs was not organized into any large combat unit; his activities were
of a passive nature, or indicated a withdrawal to the east; his
communications had been badly crippled; he had no reserve and no mobile
combat force to employ against American units driving aggressively and
swiftly into Manila. The situation was further complicated by the threats
of three separate American Divisions, the 1st Cavalry, the 37th Infantry
and the 11th Airborne, attacking the city from different directions.
Approximately 18,400 troops, including a large proportion of miscellaneous
personnel, hospital patients, and freshly inducted civilians, were
assembled and organized into provisional units of company and battalion
size for the defense of Greater Manila. About three-fourths of the
assemblage were of naval origin and one-fourth Army. Basic infantry
weapons were insufficient in number to arm all troops. Weapons were
salvaged from destroyed airplanes on Manila fields and from sunken ships
in the harbor. These provided a large proportion of the weapons utilized
by the Japanese.
The overall defenses of Greater Manila were entrusted to Rear Admiral
Iwabuchi, Mitsuji. The forces north of the Pasig River were commanded by
Col. Noguchi, former adjutant of the Fourteenth Army, who had under his
control two provisional Army battalions and one provisional Navy
battalion. Those south of the river were under the 'direct control of
Iwabuchi. The organization of the MNDF is shown in detail in Section III,
Part One.
The evidence seems conclusive that the original defenses of Manila were
prepared to meet attack from the seaward or from the south. There is no
evidence of any attempted re-organization of these defenses on the part of
the enemy until the 23rd of January, 1945. An order issued on that date,
later captured by our troops, indicated a concern for our approaching
thrust from the north. The order provided for a screening force north of
the Pasig. The southern portions of the city, especially the Paco, Ermita,
Port and Malate Districts, were covered by a great number of prepared
positions of all types. Road blocks and street barricades were constructed
at all important street intersections ; and disposed along Manila Bay were
over three hundred and fifty antiaircraft and dual purpose gun positions.
As our forces approached the city the Japanese adopted a plan of defense
which was based on the Walled City as the inner stronghold. This core was
surrounded by a rough semi-circular formation of public buildings,
garrisoned and prepared for defense. Slightly to the rear of these
buildings were other strong points. These positions consisted of a series
of well-constructed pill boxes so placed as to utilize the protection
afforded by existing obstacles, machine gun, anti-tank and rifle-fire.
While the defenders utilized prepared positions, the defense itself was
largely one of small units which were imperfectly coordinated. As the
enemy areas became further compressed the lack of integration became more
apparent. Groups of defenders became isolated in the large fortified
public buildings. This, however, did not entirely preclude the shifting of
some personnel from one building to another and some measure of mutual
support.
A map of the city proper showing principal installations discussed herein
is set forth in Annex 1.
III. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION
The enemy forces defending Manila were predominantly naval with a small
number of army troops cooperating. These forces were assigned operational
sectors as shown in
Annex 2.
The naval force was a combination of many base defense, service and
miscellaneous units, and included, in addition to the normal Naval Guard
forces assigned to a large Naval Base establishment, elements of naval
flying units, crew members of both naval and merchant ships sunk or
disabled in Manila Bay, and some civilian employees of the Naval Base.
These diverse units and individuals were successfully organized into the
Manila Naval Defense Force under the command of Rear Admiral Iwabuchi,
Mitsuji, as shown in
Annex 3. With a total strength of approximately
14,000, the force was disposed (less one battalion) south of the Pasig
River in defense sectors. The remaining battalion was located in the
southern portion of the Eastern Sector, north of the river.
The Manila Detachment, estimated strength 2,900, was originally deployed
north of the Pasig, in the Northern Sector, but ultimately concentrated
the bulk of its strength in the Intramuros and the Port District for the
final phase of the Manila operation. The South Flank Detachment, estimated
strength 1,500, was disposed in the area of Nichols Field, in the Isthmus
Sector, where they were contacted and finally destroyed.
IV. DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS
1. Buildings and Streets
a. General:
Japanese defenses
within the city were characterized by improvisation. Mines, barricades,
and weapons of all types were used; these and the tactics employed were
adapted to the situation at hand. No reliance seems to have been placed on
any particular doctrine or training except the usual Japanese tendency to
accept death rather than withdrawal. Grenades, mortars, small arms and
some artillery were used in much the same way as in any other type of
combat, the chief difference being that ranges were reduced to a minimum.
b. Buildings:
Instructions
concerning the use of buildings in defense are outlined in the following
extract from the Noguchi Force order of 23 Jan. (The directive pertains
chiefly to defense against air attack but positions constructed pursuant
thereto were used for ground defense as well.)
"a. Counter-measures to be taken against furious enemy air and artillery
bombardment before the attack of ground forces, etc. It is necessary for
each unit to take the following measures, as the enemy attempts to destroy
completely our key points by fierce bombardment prior to attack by his
ground forces.
"1. It is necessary to strengthen the buildings at each key point as much
as possible but because of the fact that no buildings can stand against
bombs of 100 kg and above, men must not gather in one building but will
deploy and take cover or construct many individual foxholes (in the shape
of an octopus-pot) and shelter trenches.
"In case of enemy bombing prior to the attack by enemy ground forces, it
is necessary to reduce losses as much as possible by having men
temporarily take cover, etc. It is preferable to reuse buildings destroyed
by bombing."
