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	  Since Manila is located within an earthquake zone, its buildings are 
	  necessarily of very strong, heavy construction gauged by American 
	  standards. As an example of this, the Finance Building in downtown Manila 
	  was so constructed that, as the lower portion of the outside walls 
	  disintegrated under the direct fire of our artillery, the walls and roof 
	  settled and the structure bent, rather than collapsed. Intramuros was 
	  surrounded by a wall varying in thickness from ten to forty feet, and 
	  contained tunnels and excavated positions for gun emplacements. Projecting 
	  from the wall were bastions heavily organized. The entire area was 
	  medieval in structure and its defense combined the fortress of the Middle 
	  Ages with the fire power of modern weapons. The Japanese used· all types of 
	  earthquake-proof structures--private homes, churches, schools and 
	  government buildings -as isolated strong points. Machine guns and 
	  anti-tank weapons were sited within the buildings in such a manner as to 
	  protect approaches. The positions· 
	  were improved by conventional defensive installations. Concrete structures 
	  were strengthened by sand bags. Entrances, stairways, windows and 
	  corridors were sandbagged or reinforced by concrete, and often protected 
	  by barricades of such construction that they withstood numerous hits from 
	  tanks firing 75 and 105mm guns at point blank ranges. Small rifle and 
	  machine-gun slits were chipped in walls. In several cases these slits were 
	  found to have the drawback of being very narrow apertures which limited 
	  fire to a single passageway; little thought seems to have been given to 
	  small arcs of traverse and search which, in some cases, would have been 
	  desirable. There were alternate positions for automatic weapons throughout 
	  the buildings. Man-made tunnels connected the rear and side with outlying 
	  bunkers. Barbed wire entanglements were 
	  
	  employed 
	  inside and outside of buildings. In adjacent grounds there were foxholes 
	  of the standing type. The enemy's main defensive organization was usually 
	  on the ground floor. In some instances troops were deployed in upper 
	  stories and on roofs to support the main defensive positions; these troops 
	  carried on the fight after our forces had seized the lower floors. Inside 
	  buildings were found bomb shelters constructed of a large cement culvert 
	  pipe, with one-half inch steel sheeting as a base for the roof, over which 
	  sandbags were stacked.  
	  Approaches to buildings were also blocked by 
	  obstacles and mines covered by rifles, machine guns and anti-tank weapons, 
	  which were normally protected by heavily sandbagged pill boxes. Full 
	  advantage was taken of stone walls around houses and buildings to add to 
	  delaying obstructions.  
	  Typical of the tenacious defense of buildings was 
	  the action centering around the Manila Hotel. After our troops occupied 
	  the upper floors of this structure following an all night battle, the 
	  enemy re-occupied the lower levels. The following morning the Japanese 
	  retired under pressure to an air raid shelter located in the basement. An 
	  estimated 200 of the enemy perished upon the sealing of the shelter 
	  entrance. 
	   
	  
	  
	
      
        
	  
	  Annex 5 - Sketch No. 18 - Denying the Approach 
	  to Quezon Bridge 
	  Charts and pictures illustrating building defenses 
	  are attached as Annexes 5 to 25. Particular attention is invited to Far 
	  Eastern University, (Annex 5) and to Rizal Stadium (Annex 6). The purpose 
	  of the defense of the University was to deny us the use of Quezon Blvd. 
	  and its approach to Quezon Bridge. No attempt was made to coordinate the 
	  defense of this position with Bilibid Prison or with Santo Tomas 
	  University, several blocks to the east. Enemy troops in Far Eastern 
	  University were estimated at not less than 200. The position was 
	  reinforced by sand bags and wooden barricades. The machine guns at the 
	  northwest corner of Quezon Blvd. and Azcarraga Ave. were emplaced in 
	  pillboxes of reinforced concrete and were additionally covered by three 
	  bands of barbed wire strung on steel rails embedded in concrete. The 
	  defense within the building was typical of that found in the Manila area. 
	   
	  
	  
	   
	  
	  
	    
	  
	  Annex 6 - Blocking the Advance on the South Side - Rizal Stadium 
	  & Harrison Park Area 
	  
	    
	  
	  
	  The Rizal Stadium area was two blocks square and 
	  consisted of four main athletic structures within a large cement stadium. 
	  A drainage ditch 15 feet wide and 10 feet deep along the entire 
	   east 
	  side of the stadium provided a natural tank trap. This approach was 
	  further protected by a concrete wall 15 feet high and 2 feet thick. Open 
	  fields to the north and west of the Stadium and a wide avenue (Vito Cruz) 
	  on the south afforded the enemy excellent fields of fire. The defense was 
	  centered around two buildings on the south side of the area, the Ball Park 
	  and the Coliseum. In each building all doors, windows and passageways were 
	  barricaded with sand bags. Small rifle slots had been chipped in the walls 
	  and street approaches were heavily mined.  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   c. 
	   
	  Streets: 
	   
	   
	  
	  
	  Streets were blocked by all types of obstacles. Intersections were 
	  barricaded and further defended by automatic and anti-tank weapons sited 
	  to cover streets approaching the intersection. Approximately fifty 
	  barriers were removed between 7 February and 3 March in the Paco, Ermita 
	  and Intramuros Districts of South Manila. Annex 26 shows an approximate 
	  reconstruction of the installation at one typical street intersection. In 
	  this particular case there was a supply of railroad car axles nearby; 
	  these were set upright in the pavement to serve as barricades.  
	   
	    
	  
	  
	    
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	   
	  
	  
	  
	  Annex 21 - Street and Building Organization 
	
	   
	    
	  2. Other Fortifications.   
	
	  
	  
	  a. Pillboxes: 
	   
	  
	  
	    
	  
	  
	  Pillboxes in the Manila area showed little departure from· 
	  the conventional type. 
	   
	    
	  
	    
	  Annex 27 illustrates a type frequently 
	  encountered. Essentially, the materials used-concrete, metal, wood and 
	  sandbags-were standard. The thickness of the pillbox walls ranged from 
	  inches to several feet. Some had the inside walls sandbagged to a depth of 
	  several feet; thus reducing fragmentation within the confines of the 
	  positions. 
	   
	  
	  
	
       The pillboxes and their immediate approaches were 
	  provided with obstacles, usually consisting of barbed wire entanglements, 
	  designed to force our troops into fire swept areas and to prevent the 
	  close approach of infantry and engineer assault groups. Connecting 
	  trenches, both covered and uncovered, were a normal part of the defensive 
	  scheme. (See 
	  
	  Pillbox and Connecting Trench - Annex 28). In some cases, tunnels led from the pillboxes to 
	  the interior of nearby buildings and other pillboxes. These connecting 
	  trenches and tunnels permitted the rapid and unobserved movement of troops 
	  to or from threatened areas. Some of the pillboxes had limited fields of 
	  fire, but, when incorporated into the general scheme of organized defense, 
	  covered each other with well directed fire. 
	   
	  
	  
	    
	  Those having limited fields of fire were in 
	  positions that did not permit the opening of fire until the assaulting 
	  troops were fairly close. Such positions, while possessing this 
	  disadvantage, had the merit of being protected from the fire of weapons in 
	  the hands of attacking troops until they were at very short ranges, as is 
	  illustrated in 
	  
	  Annex 29.  
	  
	  
	    
	  Following their doctrine of utilizing camouflage 
	  to the utmost, the Japanese found the destroyed. areas of great value in 
	  providing material with which to conceal their positions. The debris from 
	  shattered buildings furnished additional protection to pillboxes inasmuch 
	  as it acted as a buffer, when piled around and on top of the positions, by 
	  dissipating the effect of exploding shells and demolition charges. 
	   
	  
	  
	  b. Barricades: 
	   
	  
	  Like other defensive installations discussed, barricades were constructed 
	  to meet the needs of the situation as it developed. A barricade in the 
	  form of steel rails embedded in the ground and .standing six to eight feet 
	  high, irregularly spaced from two to three feet with barbed wire strung 
	  between, was commonly encountered. Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were 
	  interspersed throughout the barricade itself and in front of it. Others 
	  encountered were of the "hedgehog" and "Cheval de Frise" types. Some 
	  barricades were made by merely overturning automobiles and trucks. In 
	  other instances heavy factory machinery was moved into the streets and 
	  there firmly embedded. Fuel drums, into which steel rails or hardwood 
	  timbers were placed and then packed with cement or earth were frequently 
	  found. Here, too, barbed wire and smooth wire was used. One kind of 
	  anti-tank barricade was composed of fuel drums set upright and arranged in 
	  two or more columns. The space between these columns was then filled with 
	  dirt, as were the drums themselves, and the areas in front of the 
	  barricades were sown with mines. (Annex 32). Anti-tank ditches and shell 
	  craters used as such were employed extensively.  
	  Within buildings, corridors were heavily 
	  barricaded with ordinary household and office furniture. Other 
	  obstructions in the form of walls arranged in staggered positions were set 
	  up inside the passage ways. These walls, usually wooden forms filled with 
	  dirt, were from three to four feet thick and from seven to ten feet high, 
	  and provided enough clearance between the top of the wall and the ceiling 
	  to permit the lobbing over of grenades. (Annex 33).  
	  Although the barricades encountered in the Manila 
	  City area were frequently well made, many were hastily improvised. Despite 
	  the fact that the troops committed to the defense of the city were a 
	  conglomeration of different branches and services and were equipped with 
	  comparatively little in the way of heavy construction material and 
	  machinery, an efficient system of barricades which facilitated stubborn 
	  defense was devised.  
	  The ingenuity demonstrated in the utilization of 
	  means at hand for obstructions indicates that with more suitable materials 
	  the Japanese will in future operations oppose a more formidable type of 
	  barricade to attacking Allied troops. 
	   
	  
	  
	  c. Minefields: 
	   
	  
	  Minefields were used extensively by the enemy throughout the Manila area. 
	  Controlled and uncontrolled minefields as well as combinations of both 
	  types were found on roads, bridges, in the vicinity of barricades, and in 
	  open lots. Most minefields were covered by fire, but in many cases the 
	  enemy withdrew or was forced to evacuate from covering positions. No 
	  regular pattern within minefields was noted, and the minefields themselves 
	  were liable to be encountered anywhere. In general, the fields were poorly 
	  camouflaged, many mines being only partially buried and easy to locate. 
	   
	  There was apparently no organization in the choice 
	  of types of mines, for all available explosives were freely used and 
	  indiscriminately mixed. Naval beach mines were most common, and were 
	  followed in number by converted aerial bombs. These types were frequently 
	  found together, in the proportion of two beach mines to one aerial bomb. 
	  In addition artillery shells, mortar shells, depth charges were often used 
	  as mines.  
	  As a rule, depth charges were prepared for 
	  electrical detonation, with control wires leading to a concealed position. 
	  These were also found placed on end six to eight inches below ground 
	  level. On top of the depth charge was a ceramic or yardstick mine flush 
	  with the ground. In fields and on grassy road shoulders, depth charges 
	  with ceramic mines and trip wires, either single or interconnected, were 
	  met. Fifty-five gallon drums were found to contain depth charges in 
	  conjunction with ceramic mines. This combination was most often used in 
	  road blocks.  
	  Ceramic mines were frequently trip-wired, and 
	  yardstick mines were scattered on road surfaces or placed above buried 100 
	  pound aerial bombs. In other instances, aerial bombs with a nose impact 
	  fuse set close to the surface were found; a pressure of only fifty pounds 
	  was sufficient for detonation.  
	  
	  
	  Annex 34 shows a typical minefield in the New 
	  Manila Subdivision. North-south streets were prepared throughout with 
	  scattered mines. Two cross streets were mined; extensions into fields at 
	  the flanks included a potato patch, in which was found one of the few 
	  pattern fields laid out by the enemy. Another field at approximately the 
	  center of the subdivision, in the unused portion of a block, consisted of 
	  scattered depth charge ceramic mine combinations, all independently 
	  trip-wired with a set of easily detected yellow wires.  
	  
	  
	  Annex 35 shows a minefield on Vito Cruz between 
	  Luna and Taft A venues which illustrates the tendency to mix all available 
	  types. The three ceramic mines to the left of the anti-tank ditch were 
	  concealed under galvanized iron sheeting. The group of depth charges were 
	  all interconnected and wired to the blockhouse for controlled detonation. 
	   
	  
        
	  
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