On April 3rd a platoon of the Reconnaissance Troop, moving up from the Granada area to reconnoiter the eastern portion of the Silay-Guimbalaon road, made only minor contacts until it reached within 500 yards of Guimbalaon. There fire was encountered from enemy entrenched around the supply point. The platoon deployed and attempted to approach the barrio, first from the west and then from the south. Both times, it was repulsed by heavy rifle, 20mm and 37mm fire. Dense undergrowth in the wooded area prohibited complete observation, but at least 100 Japs were estimated to be in the immediate vicinity of the barrio, and several gun positions were definitely located. During the action, the troop directed supporting aircraft against the target with good results.

Elements of the 185th followed up the next day and secured the area after a brief fire fight. Harassed by air and artillery in his attempts at evacuation, and pursued by ground troops advancing from the west, the enemy was forced to leave behind him considerable quantities of undamaged supplies and equipment. Principal items captured in the dumps were vehicles, engineer, medical and signal supplies, some arms, ammunition, and vital stocks of food.

Throughout the week following capture of Guimbalaon, enemy action remained essentially delaying and harassing. The number of night infiltration attempts and diversionary raids to confuse the enemy as to the location of the main defenses increased. Demolition squads also made several feeble and unsuccessful attacks on installations in rear areas, notably bridges.

The enemy's AA guns, principally 20mm and 40mm, were somewhat more successful. Firing short bursts as our planes swooped low overhead, they succeeded in shooting down one B-24, one F4U, and damaging two other planes. Before the operation came to a close, a total of seven planes were lost over the Patog area, and several additional damaged.

As the battle moved farther east resistance became stronger. The first organized defense line, in the vicinity of San Juan, fell April llth, just one week after the capture of Guimbalaon. This "line" consisted of mutually supporting pillboxes and trenches, but many of these were found to be unoccupied. Night attacks continued but were growing more costly to the enemy. During two days, April llth-12th, the 185th killed 61 of the attackers.

Prior to dawn on the morning of the 13th, the enemy launched his first and only strong offensive action. An estimated 200 Japs made an attack on engineer, artillery and infantry perimeters in the 185th area. Repulsed in a three-hour battle which ended at dawn, they left behind 44 dead. Only minor damage was suffered by our forces.

On May 1st, the attack began. Infantry, advancing across the draw attacking from two directions, reached the crest of Virgne Ridge against only light resistance. Several more days were spent in cleaning out bypassed enemy pockets and reaching the western edge of Patog. Patrols entering, Patog made only minor enemy contacts before meeting patrols of the 503rd advancing south down Banana Ridge. Enemy positions were fond abandoned, bivouac areas deserted. The remaining enemy had hastily withdrawn southward to the wooded ridges leading to Hills 4055 and 4500.

CONCEPCION TO DOLAN HILL

On Y-Day, the 160th Infantry, minus the 2nd Battalion and Cannon Company, which remained on Panay, constituted the Division Reserve afloat. On Y-plus-1, the RCT landed and took over the beachhead area. On Y-plus-2, one battalion moved down the Talisay-Concepcion road to engage the Jap force which reconnaissance had contacted the day before. Patrols preceding the battalion reconnoitered east from Granada to Concepcion, in which area civilians had reported several hundred Japs dug in along the road, but only minor contacts were made. The enemy apparently was continuing his withdrawal. Combat elements moving forward the following day, however, found Concepcion reoccupied by the enemy during the night. After a brief fire fight the barrio was finally secured on the same day the 185th occupied Guimbalaon. Moving approximately two miles farther east, the 160th encountered only moderate resistance.

The next regimental objective was the prominent terrain feature, Hill 3155, later named Dolan Hill in tribute to 1st Lieutenant John W. Dolan, first officer to be killed in the attack. This hill commanded the approaches to the Patog area from the west and was indicated as the left flank of the enemy's defensive line. During the approach it was believed that elements of Colonel Yamaguchi's 172nd Independent Infantry Battalion, and probably elements of the 102nd Division Transport Regiment, the 32nd Airfield Company, and the 61st Anchorage Unit were among the defending forces. However, nearly all the 272nd Independent Infantry Battalion (less the 3rd Company, destroyed at Alimodian by the Reconnaissance Troop) and elements of the 355th Independent Infantry Battalion were actually engaged before Dolan Hill was finally taken.

In this sector, too, the enemy fought a delaying action from prepared and temporary positions on the flat open terrain west of the hill, his resistance stiffening in measure as the battle neared the mountains. The Japs were particularly active at night, using harassing fire freely against our perimeters in addition to frequent night infiltration attacks and diversionary raids.

As the advance elements drew within range, enemy positions on the forward slopes of the hill opened up with a heavy fire which they sporadically maintained throughout the ensuing weeks. Mortar and 20mm automatic fire was particularly heavy.

Patrols reconnoitering far out on the right flank made minor contacts and located enemy defensive positions near the base of Hill 4055, just south-east of Dolan Hill. One company was sent to the area to develop the situation on that flank. Separated from the battalion by deep ravines, the unit received its supplies by air drops from cub planes. It was during one such drop that Major Francis E. Tredget, regimental supply officer, lost his life when the plane was shot down by enemy fire.

The 3rd Battalion, working across draws on the northern slopes of Dolan Hill in an effort to support and establish contact with the 185th, then approaching Lantawan, met determined resistance from well entrenched enemy at several points. Impeded in their movement by the deeply cut, thickly vegetated draws, three days were spent in reducing the hostile positions and mopping up bypassed areas.

On April 17th, after two days of artillery and aerial preparation and one day of bad weather, elements of the lst Battalion jumped off on an attack up the northwest slopes of Dolan Hill.

Opposition was light the first day, but the advance was slow. Climbing the steep slope by grasping branches and roots, successive enemy positions were reached and overcome by the infantry. Late the second day, forward elements were within 100 yards of the hill crest. There the battle of Dolan Hill began in earnest. Establishing a perimeter on the steep mountainside, the battalion dug in for the night, prepared to continue the attack the following day.

That night, from their strongly entrenched positions above the infantry, the enemy laid down a withering fire. Blocks of dynamite, pole charges and grenades were tossed into the perimeter by the hostile forces on top of the hill. Unable to bring counterfire of flat trajectory weapons to bear, and too close for artillery support, the unit was finally withdrawn. Our artillery covered the withdrawal and blasted the Jap positions throughout the remainder of the night.

During the succeeding days, several attempts to reach the crest met with the sane determined resistance. Air and artillery blasted the enemy location, but their well prepared positions withstood the pounding, and results were negligible. On April 21st, a small knoll near the crest was reached and held. Both sides had suffered casualties. A number of enemy machine guns had been destroyed but the hostile force had not been dislodged. His defensive positions had been cleverly designed. Personnel caves on the reverse slope of the knoll were connected by a network of communication trenches to mutually supporting pillboxes well hidden on the narrow ridge. High on the crest of the hill in rear of these positions, machine guns sighted to cover the forward positions were later found.

For several days the situation remained unchanged. Sandbags were stacked in front of our positions to afford protection from snipers and machine guns. Any movement forward of this protection met with heavy fire from automatic weapons and mortars. Attempts were made to flank the enemy pocket, but the sheer sides of the rocky ridge prevented such moves. A trench dug forward from our position to a point where the enemy could be observed was partially successful, but observers were subjected to heavy small arms fire.

The exhausting task of supplying the assault units became more complicated. Hundreds of native carriers were employed in carrying ammunition and rations up the precipitous slopes to permit the employment of the maximum number of troops in the fighting. Engineers began bulldozing a winding road up the mountain to replace the "trail of a thousand steps" which the troops had blazed for the carriers.

Weather was another impediment. Heavy rains were common, and although mornings were not infrequently clear, low lying clouds almost invariably settled over the high ground during the afternoon, cutting visibility to a few feet.

Finally the decision was made to withdraw the troops from the hill for four days while all available air and artillery 

was concentrated on the enemy positions. P-38's, F4U's and A-20's, carrying 250 and 1000 pound bombs, strafed and bombed the hilltop in over 100 sorties. Massed fires of the division artillery were laid in successive concentrations on the area, and intermittent shelling continued night and day. Early on May 15th, the fifth day, the ' infantry moved again to the crest under the protection of heavy artillery fire. The four-day preparation had proved devastating in its effect. The once dense vegetation had been completely cleared; not a leaf remained on the bare tree stumps; 41 enemy pillboxes were found blasted to bits; over 200 enemy dead were discovered, and our troops moved to the crest unopposed. Patrols working down the sides of the ridge made several minor contacts, but the dazed remnants of the enemy force were unable to resist the occupation.

Meanwhile, the regiment had been clearing its flanks. Position by position, the enemy defenses on the north-western slopes were reduced. The large draw running northwest from the crest of the hill offered particularly difficult terrain in which to operate. Thickly wooded, steep-sided and deep, it offered perfect concealment and much natural cover to the defenders. Patrols combed it yard by yard, completely destroying each dugout, pillbox and cave discovered to prevent reoccupation.

From April 26th to 29th, the 2nd Battalion, 185th Infantry, attached to the 160th Infantry, was employed on the regiment's right in an attempt to reach the crests of Dolan Hill and Hill 4055 from that flank. The advance under enemy fire, however, was slow due to the virtually impassable terrain, and the battalion was finally returned to the 185th at Lantawan where it could be more effectively employed.

TERKUKUNI AND KASAGI RIDGE

By this time, the enemy situation was rapidly deteriorating. Heavy casualties were known to have been sustained by the enemy and his food and ammunition supplies were slowly dwindling. Approximately 2500 effectives constituted his total combat strenth, according to estimates. All that remained of his original defensive line was a small pocket on the north end of Dolan Hill and the Hill 4055 entrenchments. His division headquarters had been discovered and shelled by artillery and finally overrun by infantry. It was believed that the seizure of Hill 4055 would render his forces impotent and end the Negros operation.

185th Infantry was pushing south from Patog. The 3rd Battalion, 503rd, was meeting stubborn resistance along a line running west from the Malago and several hundred yards south of Patog astride the ridge which the Japs had named Terukuni. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 185th were engaged in cleaning out the deep ravine of the Malisbog on the right of the 503rd, while the 1st Battalion advanced up a ridge running south from Lantawan. This slope, actually the northern part of Hill 4055 mass, the Japanese had named Kasagi Ridge.

From the crest of Dolan Hill the 160th was in position to assist by fire and observation the advance of the 185th on Kasagi. Elements of the 185th advanced 500 yards the first day and 400 on the second. The ground had been well prepared by the enemy, with particular attention to sniper positions. Automatic weapons were numerous, and many heavy machine guns were encountered. Terukuni Ridge just to the east was also strongly fortified in the same manner. Its heavy rain forest was spotted with snipers both on the ground and in the trees, and on at least one occasion a machine gun was encountered mounted on a platform built in a tree. Also in this area was the enemy's last known 20mm guns.

Both Terukuni and Kasagi were subjected to bombardment by artillery, mortars and aircraft, as the 185th coved forward. Gains were still in hundreds of yards. Enemy positions were cleverly concealed, and the Japs were careful not to give them away unnecessarily. Patrols carried the burden of the operation, locating defense points and in most cases destroying them on the spot.

The 160th Infantry at this time had consolidated its positions on the crest of Dolen Hill and was feeling out the enemy stronghold on the edge of the    spur which ran north therefrom. This knot of strongly entrenched, well constructed pillboxes and interlacing trenches. In order to reduce this defense area it was necessary for one unit to encircle it by moving around the flanks along slopes verging on the vertical, while the other attacked frontally. Such movements were necessarily slow and subject to immediate and heavy energy fire at any time they were observed. Having encircled the position, the assault units faced each other at a distance of 150 yards with the enemy position between. Artillery was registered on the enemy pocket. Precision adjustment was necessitated by the proximity of our troops. On the morning of May 23rd, a division concentration was laid on the area. When fire was lifted the infantry closed in and easily overran the position. One hundred twenty-nine enemy dead were counted in the area, 15 machine guns were captured, and 42 pillboxes destroyed. The last of the enemy's basic combat units, the 172nd Independent Infantry Battalion of the 77th Brigade, had been destroyed.

- 16 - 

Following the capture of Dolan Hill, the G-2 Language Section, with the voluntary help of a prisoner, delivered via public address system appeals for the enemy to surrender. Broadcasts were also conducted in the Patog and Hill 3355 areas. Results were not immediate, but propaganda coupled with the enemy's calamitous situation eventually brought daily surrenders of groups averaging from five to ten men.

 In their statements these prisoners universally confirmed reports regarding the enemy's shortage of supplies and loss of personnel and acknowledged the hopelessness not only of their own situation but that of the Japanese nation as well.

Typical of the reports received are the following:

"The battalions (four combat battalions of the 6th Air Sector) contained about 250 men each on April 17th, but prisoner of war estimates the present total strength of the four as 200 to 300."

"The consensus of eleven prisoners today is that all enemy combat units have suffered severe losses in strength, but service units are still up to 75 to 80 percent of their original."

"The present strength of the 355th Independent Infantry Battalion is 50 men. My own unit suffered 'heavy' casualties from artillery bombardment in the vicinity of Hill 3155."

"On May 26th, the warehouse consisted of two tents containing enough unhulled rice to last the enemy forces one month."

Five Filipino collaborators, who had been with the Japs in the hills until June, reported the 172nd Independent Infantry Battalion with "50 rifles, improvised grenades, and machine guns. Naval units are not equipped with weapons. Very little machine gun ammunition. Rifle ammunition is scarce but there is some. Rice and salt are the only food. It is estimated that the supply will last about 15 days." Medical supplies they described as non-existent.

Prisoner from the 153rd Airfield, Battalion stated, "The current rice supply for combat troops is about 200 grams per week, but sick and wounded personnel not capable of fighting receive only a handful during the same period." Two weeks prior to his capture this prisoner was in the enemy hospital. At that time