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ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM 1. ORIENTATION The fact that each and every man in the Battalion had been well oriented in the operation, helped greatly for the initial phase to be successfully completed. Assembly points were gone over and over again until there wasn't any doubt in any person's mind. Troops after landing, quickly went to designated points and commenced their part of the show. 2. USE OF SMALL UNITS The decision to drop 8 men at a time on Fields A and B was made -- even though these landing zones were anything but suitable, as they were littered with rubble, tree stumps, and bomb-craters. When parachuting first came into vogue, as a means of combat, the main idea or mission was to land small units in enemy held territory -- destroy the enemy, installations and then await for reinforcements. However, during World War II, airborne troops were committed on large scales, with very few being committed on a Battalion level. It is in my opinion, that small unit operations will be used to a greater degree in any future wars. 3. COORDINATION The close coordination between the navy, airforce and our ground forces, in a small operation such as this, is without parallel. Coordination from the time operation was planned, to the time it was completed, is an excellent example how our armed forces can JASCO personnel on the island went a long way in establishing this well coordination operation. The fact that this was JASOO personnel first jump from a plane is well in their favor. 4. ENEMY INFORMATION Intelligence had information of enemy strength to be approximately 850! When operation was completed, at least 6000 enemy were destroyed! Aerial photographs, taken prior to the assault and after comparison with pre-war photos, clearly showed no changes taking place, and it wasn't until the troops had landed that the presence of a large force of enemy was discovered. With very little information available relative to the enemy the assault plan for the 3d Battalion was clear and concise. After landing and exploiting to north and northeast, a more complete plan was put into effect, as contact with the enemy was maintained. 5. SURPRISE The element of surprise, which is the parachutists main advantage, worked to perfection in the 3d Battalion assault. The heavy bombing, which had preceded the assault, had driven the enemy into their caves, thereby, causing the airborne attack to be that more successful. It was at least an hour before any form of organized resistance was contacted by our units. 6. ENEMY ANTICIPATION. The enemy had adequately prepared for an amphibious landing and even though warned, had not anticipated an airborne landing on the island. The Japanese Commander, in making an estimate of the situation, regarding the possibility of an airborne attack, made the inexcusable error by ignoring this possibility. If he had prepared defenses for an airborne landing -- the mission of capturing Corregidor might have taken a little longer.
7. SUPPORT
FIRE The enemy entrenched in their caves, awaiting the landing of amphibious troops, were not anticipating fire from "Topside", therefore, with the 3d Battalion, 503d supporting the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry by fire from "Topside", the landing was successful. 8. USE OF CONTROL SHIP It was estimated, in the pre-planning phase, that 20 per cent casualties would be experienced by the RCT; however, in the actual jump, this per centage figure was lowered to 10.7 per cent. The use of the control ship proved its usefulness, and was the main factor in lowering the casualties of the 3d and 2d Battalions. 9. LOSS OF ENEMY COMMANDER The Japanese commander, leaving his command post in Malinta Tunnel, is order to view the amphibious assault and soon afterwards being killed by our men -- greatly enhanced our success, as it took the enemy a long time afterward to become again organized. 10. RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS The morale factor was greatly advanced among the troops, when every jumpmaster was given the opportunity to fly over the target. area on a reconnaissance mission, on regular bomb-runs, to view the terrain and his established "go-point". 11. EXPLOSIONS At various times during the process of the attack, or when in a perimeter defense -- the enemy, being fanatical, would set off underground arsenals situated under our troops. These violent explosions would cause many casualties among our troops, causing the attack to be slowed down to some degree. 12. ENEMY FIELDS OF FIRE It was found, that the Japanese would invariably sacrifice fields of fire in order to obtain concealment. In doing this, he would let our troops advance up to his position, and them set off an explosive charge causing many casualties among our troops. When attacking these caves, the troopers constantly had to look for other exits and cover them, while the demolition crew worked on the main entrance. 13. EVACUATION In the early stages of the operation, injured and wounded personnel at Battalion and Regimental Aid Stations could not be evacuated, until the road leading from the beach to "Topside" was opened. With such a small area, containing both our troops and the enemy, it is quite conceivable to understand that our wounded, injured and medical personnel were under fire a good deal of the time. Upon opening of the road, water could now be taken up to the troops. 14. PERIMETER DEFENSE Some persons, undoubtedly, would question the withdrawing at times of our forces into a perimeter for the night and the following day push forward and retake the ground taken the previous day. Reason for this motive was, whoever had control of "Topside" -- more or less, controlled the situation. 15. WP GRENADES WP grenades were carried by all personnel who were on combat patrols. These were favored over the hand grenades anD were used individually, or in conjunction with flamethrowers and automatic weapons. 16. CRITICAL TERRAIN The enemy failed, in many Cases, to occupy, organize and defend a critical terrain feature. This was exemplified in the early stages of the operation -- especially, in the north sector of H Company. . 17. AGGRESSIVENESS The aggressiveness of patrols by always advancing and pushing forward, carrying the fight to the enemy, clearly showed the character of the American soldier who possessed the drive, determination and skill of men who were doing the actual fighting.
LESSONS 1. Supervision is definitely reduced, as a problem, to an easy task provided every man in the organization is well acquainted with the complete situation. 2. Landing drop zones, no matter how small or how rugged, can be used successfully by airborne troops. 3. It is recommended, that special units, such as JASCO, be trained as airborne personnel, in order for them to accompany air assault units upon operations like Corregidor. Close liaison is necessary, between ground personnel and supporting arms (navy and airforce) if coordination is to be successful. 4. Do not be optimistic, when information regarding the enemy strength is a diminutive figure and with photos not showing any noticeable change in terrain features -- for the enemy had utilized his camouflage training to perfection. 5. Airborne troops can be successfully used upon small drop areas and effect complete surprise, if air superiority is gained and the drop is adequately controlled. However, upon landing, they must expect enemy contact for even though the target area had undergone a terrific bombing -- the Japanese just holed up in their caves and were unharmed. 6. Commanders, enemy or U.S., should never make the error in ignoring the possibility of any method of attack -- be it land, sea or air. 7. In an airborne operation of this type, it is advisable to employ airborne troops to support amphibious troops in the latter's initial landing phase. 8. Whenever possible, it is recommended a control ship be utilized -- especially, if drop area is small and prevailing winds are present. Recommend carrying 10 per cent overstrength on an operation such as Corregidor. 9. A Commander, in a defense situation, should be in immediate vicinity of his CP, where he can control all troops under his command. He can estimate the situation and formulate his plan at the CP, by having information coming into him. 10. It is recommended, whenever situation presents itself and you have air superiority, to have jumpmasters fly over and view the targets. 11. It is recommended, if our troops are up against a fanatical enemy like the Japanese, that they cover enemy caves and positions from a distance rather than closing in close and sitting on top of a possible arsenal. 12. Our combat patrols, when coming upon trails or caves, should be aware, when not receiving enemy fire, of a possible concealed ambush, or explosives being set off. 13. In order to evacuate the casualties, it is advisable to make a priority on a certain route to be cleared, of enemy, as soon as possible. 14. In terrain such as Corregidor, it is advisable to withdraw at night and go into a perimeter defense, to insure possession of the main terrain feature, from which to operate. 15. It was found out that WP grenades were much better to use, than ordinary hand grenades, when throwing into shallow caves -- thus driving the enemy out and to destruction. 16. A force which does not take advantage of a critical terrain feature, only hastens its defeat. 17. Aggressiveness should be stressed in all phases of training and by commanders to their combat units.
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