|
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM The question which immediately comes to mind after a study of the Corregidor operation is whether the assignment was too much for a parachute regimental combat team. The answer from the aggressive, hard-hitting members of Colonel George M. Jones� 503d Parachute Infantry, with their superior morals and esprit de corps, would be an emphatic, �No! Just look at the record�. It must be realized that the strength of the enemy had been estimated to be 850, whereas the actual strength was between 5500 and 6000. It does not follow, though, if the actual number of enemy had been known, that two divisions (to carry through on the proportion of 850 enemy per RCT) would have been required to reduce the island fortress. However, it does appear that even though the strength of the enemy was estimated at 850 only, insufficient armor was provided. Experience had proved all through the war in the Pacific area that the enemy even in slam groups could for extended periods of time cause heavy casualties to our forces because of his uncanny ability to �hole up� in caves and emplacements. We paid dearly for that lesson. However, when Corregidor was to be assaulted, �a long prepared and fanatical enemy, strongly entrenched in numerous tunnels, caves, dugouts, and crevices, awaited the assault in commanding and extensively fortified positions�. (130) Yet in spite of the lessons learned, three tanks only (to come in on the amphibious assault) were allotted to the forces; one tank was knocked out by mines when it landed on the shore. Too, one company of parachute engineers and the small Demolition Platoon of Regimental Headquarters Company were the few troops which had the tremendous task of sealing the caves, tunnels, and dugouts. The Platoon, in the twelve days of combat (mostly within the first ten days) expended 11,500 pounds of explosives and sealed over 200 caves and tunnels. In the same period, the Engineer Company expended twice as much explosives and sealed a like number of caves and tunnels. It seems that at least a platoon of tanks and one or two more engineer platoons would have minimized our casualties and possibly have reduced the overall time required to seize the island. Inasmuch as Colonel Jones made the decision to have the third lift arrive one day after the scheduled drop, there was no need for any additional infantry troops. That is, the Parachute Regiment and the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, were sufficient to handle the situation. One point which stands out very noticeably throughout the operation is the thorough, complete, willing, and enthusiastic cooperation between all the armed services - - the army, Navy, and Air Force. The very close liaison between the staffs of the Regiment and that of the 317th Troop Carrier Group minimized the losses from the jump itself, in that both pilots and jumpmasters were thoroughly acquainted with the plans, limitations, and capabilities of each other. The commanding officers themselves maintained close liaison more on a personal than an austere, official, cold basis. This spirit of comradeship which pervaded the associations of the two organizations had its inception eighteen months previously in the first combat mission of the Regiment and had grown in a subsequent mission in July, 1944. The obvious conclusion to such a profitable alliance is that the same airborne units should work together with the same troop carrier units in all operations where a combination of the services is utilized. The cooperation from the Air Force was not limited to the troop carrier unit, for the Parachute Maintenance Platoon of the Regiment received superior cooperation from the Air Force supply at Mindoro Island, where the Regiment was stationed at the time it had been alerted for the drop. The shortage of parachute maintenance equipment was a serious threat to attainment of the target date, but Air Force supply did everything possible to assist the Regiment. The target date was met, although some improvisation was necessary. Even after the operation had commenced, the Air Forces at Mindoro continued to cooperate with assistance in aerial resupply. Tactical cooperation from the Air Force was obtained via JASCO personnel who had jumped with the Regiment, as well as via an Air Force liaison officer who came in later by boat. Response for air strikes was rapid and accurate to an outstanding degree; an attempt was made during the discussion of the operation to show how closely the tactical air force worked with the assault patrols as well as with the assaulting battalions. Naval cooperation, too, was outstanding beyond all expectations. From the moment PT boats picked up parachutists who had drifted over the cliffs during the jump to the taking of the Regimental Staff to Luzon at the conclusion of the operation to present the After Operation Report, the Navy was an invaluable part of the operation. Mine-sweeping to pave the way for the amphibious assault, shelling enemy installations, direct firing on caves preceding patrol assaults, furnishing intermittent night illumination, resupplying the beachhead, and evacuating dead and wounded were among the many tasks performed by the Navy. In brief, then, the navy because of the nature of the target area, performed services and support which would normally have been furnished an RCT by division field artillery and quartermaster units. The support furnished by the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, was of immeasurable value to the RCT. That Battalion prevented the eastern force of enemy from joining those on �Topside� and, undoubtedly, eliminating the parachutists on the first night of the assault. Our forces on �Topside� totaled 2000 troops with minimum equipment and supplies, whereas the enemy at the time of the parachute assault had a minimum of 5500 well-fed and well-equipped troops with high morale and esprit de corps. In like manner, the parachutists on the high ground of �Topside� were able to assist in the diversion of the enemy during the amphibious assault. Consequently, almost three years of preparation, practically all underground, and an island fortress were rendered ineffective by the vertical envelopment. The characteristic spirit of cooperation so prevalent in the entire operation existed intra-service, as well as inter-service. An examination of the cooperative spirit between the services shows that cooperation was brought about, in addition to the natural desire of all forces of our country to work together, by detailed and careful planning. Forward observers for both the Air Force and Navy worked well with assault patrols. Communication facilities to control these supporting fires were installed within a few hours of the parachute landing and functioned well and continuously. Liaison by staff officers, as well as by commanding officers themselves, in frequent conferences prior to the invasion contributed immeasurably to working out the details of the operation. It has already been shown that the principle of mass was violated when only 1000 parachutists were initially dropped in the midst of a minimum of 5500 enemy, whereas attackers should outweigh the defenders by heavy odds. Consequently, the operation proves the value of surprise, for that principle of war along with the principle of cooperation greatly compensated for the gross violation. In fact, the surprise - - attributed mostly to the performance of an act originally believed impossible - - was so effective that the enemy actually thought our forces numbered 8000 to 10000. It was this belief that dictated the tactics employed by the enemy, tactics which saved our forces. Had the enemy pursued a course of relentless, coordinated attack early in the operation, instead of stubborn defense accompanied by suicidal activities, the outcome might have been different. So great was the effect of the surprise on the enemy, that there is justifiable reason for doubt as to which principle, if one can be isolated, was the more important: cooperation or surprise. A choice, of course is unnecessary, but the obvious conclusion appears to be that a very important (possibly the most important) principle of war may be violated, if adequate compensation in the form of strong emphasis on other important principles are provided. Another point which played no small part in the success of the operation is the utter simplicity of the plan of ground action. It was apparent from the lack of detailed information and data relative to enemy strength, equipment, location, dispositions, and organization that no detailed plan of ground action could be formulated in advance of actual ground reconnaissance. Consequently, except for a few general details, the plan was extremely simple: while the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, acted as a block to keep the enemy forces on the eastern from joining those on the western sector, the 503d Parachute Infantry was to seize the island: first, the western sector and then the eastern. The western sector was to be divided into zones of battalion responsibility. In substance, that was the plan - - simplicity in itself. However, once the landing had been effected and all through the operation, the most careful, coordinated, and methodical planning had to be made. But this planning was pertinent to each individual section and uncomplicated by detailed, extraneous plans. The enemy, luckily for his forces, was seriously at fault in that he made the irreparable error of underestimating his enemy. The Commander of the island made an estimate of the situation, but despite warnings, eliminated vertical envelopment as a capability of the American forces in an assault on the island. The shame on the enemy is all the more unpardonable when one considers that it was this quality of underestimation of the enemy on the part of the Allies which contributed so greatly to the early successes of the Japanese army in 1941 and 1942. The enemy erred, too, when he failed, apparently, to provide subordinate leaders capable of assuming immediate command, in the event of the death of the commanding officer. The enemy commander was killed within the first few hours of the operation, yet it was not until three days later that coordination of any sort appeared in the tactics employed by the enemy. Even after that fatal delay, the manifested sections were hardly commensurate with the capabilities of the enemy. However, in one respect, the enemy succeeded: he succeeded in disposing at least 5500 men in strong installations in an area less than two miles square, yet gave the impression that his forces numbered but an estimated 850. Our country would hardly condone the execution of laborers to prevent disclosure of the installations and construction, which procedure it was rumored that the Japanese employed, of course. In addition to that reputed system, the enemy made few improvements in installations located above ground and allowed the landscape to assume all the aspects of desertions, destruction, and a prompt return to nature�s development of jungle-like vegetation. At any rate, the fact remains that out intelligence agencies were successfully denied information for evaluation and interpretation. Consequently, the attackers were outnumbered two-to-one, even after all our forces had arrived, whereas the attacking forces should exceed that of the defense. In the operation, it was not necessary to employ a pathfinder unit to locate the drop zones in advance, in that all jumpmasters and key officers had already seen the fields from bombing planes during regular bombing missions prior to the day of the jump. There was no mistaking the so-called drop zones: Despite the possibility of the loss of key airborne personnel during the time they were observers in the bombers, the advantages gained from this procedure were worth the risk. The available maps gave slight indication of the condition of the drop zones; the debris, snags, and wrecked buildings were discovered by the aerial reconnaissance conducted from the bombers; the selection of a �go point�, command posts and other installations were made during these flights. As a consequence, much time was saved as well as a maximum pre-jump reconnaissance made by virtue of these bomber flights. Another advantage which might have been gained from a pathfinder team but which was secured without its use was control of the jumpers during the actual drop. The leading plane of each lift was the control plane and made adjustments of the timing of the jumpmasters as well as the altitude at which the planes were flying all through the drop. The advantages of this procedure are especially noteworthy in this operation inasmuch as the most difficult part of the operation was the placing of the parachutists on the completely unsuitable drop zones. Jump losses were considerably fewer than anticipated as a result of this effective, immediate control plus the the thorough briefing and indoctrination of the pilots, who were completely cognizant of the importance of precision flying over the drop zones. During the discussion in Phase I � Preparation, a comment was made relative to prior amphibious training received by elements of the 1st Battalion for a previous combat mission. That prior training proved its worth in the unexpected and hasty amphibious move made by the 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, when the drop of this third lift was cancelled. An analysis of other activities of the RCT during the operation shows, similarly, that highly trained and skilful troops can readily adapt themselves to new tactics and techniques, without prior training. Examples are found from the tank-infantry assault teams clear though to the operation of a �hospital� for three days by the Regimental Medical Department, inasmuch as evacuation facilities did not exist. An obvious conclusion to be drawn from the success of this operation despite the handicaps and obstacles of superior enemy numbers and hazardous drop zones is that in the employment of parachutes the main consideration is tactical. The recapture of Corregidor Island, ���one of the most difficult missions of the Pacific war,� (131) may best be summed up in the wording of the citation given the regiment by the War Department: ���they attacked savagely against numerically superior enemy, defeated him completely, and seized the fortress. Their magnificent courage, tenacity, and gallantry avenged the victims of Corregidor of 1942 and achieved a significant victory for the United States Army�. The Regiment was cited for its actions on Corregidor by the commanding Generals of Sixth Army and XI Corps: under the provisions of Section IV, WD Circular 333, dated 1943, the Regiment was awarded the Distinguished Badge. LESSONS Some of the lessons learned from this operation are: There is no substitute for personal contact in inter- as well as intra-service liaison. Parachute operations require extensive liaison to insure thorough cooperation between the interested services. When an important principle of war is violated, strong emphasis must be placed on other important principles to compensate for the violation. Plans for parachute drops of personnel should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate even major changes in tactical plans for the employment of parachutists. Intelligence estimates of enemy strength are merely estimates and can be very misleading. Use of a control plane during the actual jump can minimize casualties caused by strong changing winds and poor drop zones. Parachute organizations must be prepared to administer to all casualties for long periods of time until evacuation can be effectuated. surprise, once gained, must be exploited rapidly and aggressively. Infantry organizations must have thorough training in the use of assault teams with and without engineer support. The use of interpreters with regimental headquarters is invaluable. This personnel should jump with command post personnel. During the combat operation troops disciplined in the appropriate medical prophylaxis will have few non-battle casualties from such preventable sicknesses as malaria in a tropical area and dysentery in an area contaminated by a multitudinous quantity of flies and filth. No one means of transportation should be relied on for the resupply of parachute troops. In assaults of a fortified installation, infantry troops must to be taught to push on after the installation has been reduced and leave the complete destruction to the engineers in the assault party. Greatest advantage of aerial and/or naval bombardment of a target accrues to the infantry when the assault team follows immediately and aggressively upon cessation of the supporting fires. Forward observers and contact personnel of supporting services should be well forward with the assault units not only for more accurate sensing of fires, but also to recommend most suitable types of ammunition for the target. When infantry units operate over terrain which lends itself to the construction of caves, dugouts, and tunnels, sufficient engineer and tank units should be attached. Personnel in well constructed caves, tunnels, and other underground installations are relatively safe from bombing attacks. Regardless of the extent of the bombing (at least, non-atomic) of a target, to seize and secure a target, whether it be installation or area, the most potent means of all the services combined remain the infantryman mounted on his own two feet.
-o-0-o- |
